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ARTICLE 
THE NEW TITANS OF WALL STREET: A THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR PASSIVE INVESTORS 
JILL FISCH, ASSAF HAMDANI & STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON† 
If index funds underperform active funds, then assets will flow out from 
passives to actives.  —  Bill Ackman, CEO, Pershing Square Management1 
 
Passive investors—ETFs and index funds—are the most important development 
in modern-day capital markets, dictating trillions of dollars in capital flows and 
increasingly owning much of corporate America. Neither the business model of passive 
funds, nor the way that they engage with their portfolio companies, however, is well 
understood, and misperceptions of both have led some commentators to call for passive 
investors to be subject to increased regulation and even disenfranchisement. 
Specifically, this literature takes a narrow view both of the market in which passive 
investors compete to manage customer funds and of passive investors’ participation in 
the capital markets. 
 
† Jill Fisch is the Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School; Assaf Hamdani is a Professor at Tel Aviv University, Buchman School of 
Law & Coller School of Management; Steven Davidoff Solomon is Professor of Law at the 
University of California Berkeley, School of Law. Preliminary drafts of this paper were presented at 
the IESE CCG-ECGI Conference on Corporate Governance and Ownership with Diverse 
Shareholders, the Boston University School of Law, the Davies Business Law Lecture Series at the 
Toronto Club, the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, the NYU Law & Economics Workshop, 
the Hastings Law & Economics Workshop, the Tulane Corporate and Securities Roundtable, the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law & Economics Corporate Roundtable, and 
the University of Wisconsin School of Law where we received many helpful comments. We are also 
grateful to Donna Anderson, Lucian Bebchuk, Glenn Booream, Alon Brav, Quinn Curtis, Merritt 
Fox, Zohar Goshen, Robert Jackson, Jr., Roy Katzovicz, Ann Lipton, Dorothy Shapiro Lund, Justin 
McCrary, Alessio Pacces, Ed Rock, Eric Roiter, Bonnie Saynay, Jeff Schwartz, Anne Tucker, and 
Andrew Verstein for thoughtful comments. 
1 Email from Steve Fraidin, General Counsel, Pershing Square Capital, to Steven Davidoff 
Solomon (May 30, 2018) (on file with authors). 
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We respond to this failure by providing the first comprehensive theoretical 
framework for passive investment  and its implications for corporate governance. To 
start, we explain that to understand passive funds, it is necessary to understand the 
institutional context in which they operate. Two key insights follow. First, because 
passive funds are simply a pool of assets, their incentives are a product of the overall 
business operations of fund sponsors. Second, although passive funds are locked into their 
investments, their shareholders are not. Like all mutual fund investors, shareholders in 
index funds can exit at any time by selling their shares and receiving the net asset value 
of their ownership interest. Consequently, the sponsors of passive funds compete on both 
price and performance with other investment options—including other passive funds as 
well as actively managed funds—for investor dollars. As we explain, this competition 
provides passive fund sponsors with a variety of incentives to engage with the companies 
in their portfolios. Furthermore, the size of the major fund sponsors and the breadth of 
their holdings affords them economies of scale that not only justify engagement 
economically but also enable them to engage effectively. 
An examination of passive investor engagement in corporate governance 
demonstrates that passive investors behave in accordance with this theory. Passive 
investors are devoting greater sophistication and resources to engagement with their 
portfolio companies and are exploiting their comparative advantages—their size, 
breadth of portfolio, and resulting economies of scale—to focus on issues with a broad 
market impact, such as potential corporate governance reforms, that have the potential 
to reduce the underperformance and mispricing of portfolio companies. Passive investors 
use these tools, as opposed to analyzing firm-specific operational issues, to reduce the 
relative advantage that active funds gain through their ability to trade. 
We conclude by exploring the overall implications of the rise of passive investment 
for corporate law and financial regulation. We argue that, although existing critiques 
of passive investors are unfounded, the rise of passive investing raises new concerns 
about ownership concentration, conflicts of interest, and common ownership. We 
evaluate these concerns and the extent to which they warrant changes to existing 
regulation and practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Passive investors, or more accurately the large mutual fund complexes that 
manage most of the assets invested in passively managed funds, are the new 
power brokers of modern capital markets.2 Drawn by the lower costs of these 
products as well as a literature reporting that even savvy money managers 
cannot consistently beat the market,3 an increasing number of retail investors 
invest through indexed mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs)4 
(collectively, index funds or passive funds)—funds that do not make 
information-based trading decisions. This shift has concentrated a growing 
portion of publicly traded equity in the hands of the sponsors that operate 
these index funds, particularly the Big Three—BlackRock, Vanguard, and 
 
2 We note at the outset the potential ambiguity in the term “passive investor.” A variety of 
rules-based investment strategies may be termed “passive,” such as algorithmic trading, and asset 
owners can employ a passive investment strategy without using a product such as a mutual fund or 
ETF. See, e.g., Andrew W. Lo, What Is an Index?, 42 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 21, 21-22 (2016) 
(describing the breadth of investment strategies that could be termed index investing and arguing 
that the critical characteristics of an index are that it be “transparent, investable, and systematic”). 
Moreover, as Adriana Robertson has convincingly demonstrated, it is somewhat misleading to term 
an index-based strategy “passive” in that the creation and choice of the index are themselves 
managed (active) investment strategies. See Adriana Z. Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated 
Management and ‘Index’ Investing, 36 YALE J. REG. 795, 843 (2019). We do not extensively address 
these issues in this Article and instead focus on traditional index funds and ETFs, employing the 
popular terminology of “passive investors.” 
3 The popular press has repeatedly reported that actively managed funds systematically 
underperform index funds and their market benchmarks. See, e.g., Mark Hulbert, This Is How Many 
Fund Managers Actually Beat Index Funds, MARKETWATCH (May 13, 2017, 10:46 AM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-way-fewer-actively-managed-funds-beat-the-sp-than-we-
thought-2017-04-24 [https://perma.cc/MAX4-ALTG] (reporting that “[o]ver the last 15 years, 92.2% 
of large-cap funds lagged a simple S&P 500 index fund”). The story in the finance literature is more 
complex and to date there is evidence that actively managed funds may, over the long term, have 
advantages over passive funds. See infra notes 82; see also Diane Del Guercio & Jonathan Reuter, 
Mutual Fund Performance and the Incentive to Generate Alpha, 69 J. FIN. 1673, 1676 (2014) (finding 
“strong support . . . that actively managed funds earn the same expected after-fee alphas as index 
funds” within the “direct-sold segment” of the mutual fund market). 
4 An ETF is a fund which tracks an index but is publicly traded on the market rather than 
purchased directly from (or sold to) the fund sponsor. See What are ETFs?, NASDAQ, 
https://www.nasdaq.com/etfs/what-are-ETFs.aspx [https://perma.cc/SQ4R-GMMU] (last visited 
July 16, 2019). Both mutual funds and ETFs are considered investment companies under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940. See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (2018). 
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State Street.5 Although the extent to which index funds will continue to grow 
remains unclear, some estimates predict that by 2024 they will hold over 50% 
of the market.6 
Commentators have expressed concern, even alarm, over the growth of 
passive investors and its implications for capital market efficiency and 
corporate governance.7 This literature, however, largely misconstrues or 
ignores the institutional structure of passive funds and the market context in 
which they operate.8 As a result, it fails accurately to reflect the incentives of 
passive investors. Moreover, by marginalizing passive investors with 
assertions of apathy or collusion, the literature has failed to appreciate the 
serious implications of the rise of passive investment for corporate law and 
governance. 
We respond to that deficit. In this Article, we provide the first 
comprehensive theoretical framework for passive investment. We use this 
framework to explore the role of passive funds in corporate governance. We 
 
5 See, e.g., Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the 
Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 
BUS. & POL. 298, 298, 304 (2017) (explaining that BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street dominate 
the passive fund industry and terming them the “Big Three”). 
6 See Trevor Hunnicutt, Index Funds to Surpass Active Fund Assets in U.S. by 2024: Moody’s, 
REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2017, 9:31 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-passive/index-funds-to-
surpass-active-fund-assets-in-u-s-by-2024-moodys-idUSKBN15H1PN [https://perma.cc/5R6B-3U7J]. 
7 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional 
Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 90 (2017) (arguing that the rise of index investing has “systemwide 
adverse consequences on governance”); Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 
43 J. CORP. L. 493, 495 (2018) (arguing that passive investors lack adequate incentives to become 
informed shareholders); Shawn Langlois, Robert Shiller: Passive Investing Is a ‘Pseudoscience’ and It’s 
Bad for Markets, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 15, 2017, 1:11 PM), https://www.mar
ketwatch.com/story/robert-shiller-passive-investing-is-a-pseudoscience-and-its-bad-for-markets-
2017-11-14 [https://perma.cc/HY92-DF8X] (citing interview in which Nobel Prize-winning 
economist Robert Shiller describes indexing as a “‘chaotic system’ that’s taking a toll on the business 
landscape across the United States”); see also Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal 
Shareholding and Antitrust Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 2026, 2026 (2018) (arguing that ownership 
concentration by the largest passive investors will undermine product market competition); Eric A. 
Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power of 
Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 669-70 (2017) (same). 
8 We note that, since we posted the initial draft of this article to SSRN, scholars have posted 
several other pieces exploring the role and incentives of passive investors in more depth. See Lucian 
A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and 
Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1-2), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3282794 (arguing that index funds currently expend insufficient resources on firm 
monitoring); John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve 2 
(Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper, Paper No. 19-07, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247337 
(discussing the rise of indexing and policy responses to concentration of public company control 
into the hands of very few institutional investors); Edward B. Rock & Marcel Kahan, Index Funds 
and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders be Shareholders 33-34 (ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, 
Paper No. 467, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295098 (analyzing index funds’ incentives and 
information structure and concluding that they align with responsible corporate governance). 
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then explore the overall implications of the increasingly influential role 
enjoyed by passive funds for corporate law, including the allocation of power 
between management and shareholders, the regulation of voting, and the 
concentration of economic power. 
Commentators focus their criticism on two key attributes of passive 
funds. First, passive funds, by virtue of their investment strategy, are locked 
into the portfolio companies they hold. They cannot exploit mispricing or 
other informational advantages through trading, nor can they follow the Wall 
Street Rule and exit from underperforming companies the way traditional 
shareholders, particularly active funds, can.9 Second, passive funds compete 
against other passive funds that track the same index, not on the basis of the 
performance of their portfolio (because the funds hold the same index), but 
primarily on cost.10 Firm-specific research is costly, and because they have 
committed to track the returns of an index, passive funds cannot exploit 
information-based trading to improve their returns. Critics therefore argue 
that it is irrational for passive investors to research and monitor their 
portfolio companies.11 
We challenge this portrayal of the passive investor business model as 
incomplete and offer a more nuanced approach. To start, while the term 
passive fund is widely used, it is frequently misunderstood. Although a 
passive fund is a fund that is managed to track an index, there are a wide 
variety of indexes, meaning that there is substantial variation among passive 
funds. The construction and management of the index is not passive but 
entails a form of managed investing, if not by the passive funds themselves, 
then by the index providers. Moreover, although a large number of funds 
track some popular indexes like the S&P 500, other funds track a bespoke 
index created just for that fund.12 In addition, some nominally passive funds 
afford their managers a degree of discretion in choosing among the stocks on 
 
9 See Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit 
as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2645, 2647 (2009) (detailing how large shareholders respond 
to poor performance through exit rather than exercising their voting power). 
10 See, e.g., Jeff Sommer, A Price War Has Driven Fund Fees to Zero. They May Be Set to Drop 
Further., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/business/price-war-fund-
fees-zero-negative.html [https://perma.cc/W6UM-KNQ6] (explaining how competition among 
large index fund sponsors is reducing investor costs). The literature notes that passive funds also 
compete on tracking quality. See, e.g., Ari I. Weinberg, Watch an Index Fund’s ‘Tracking Error,’ WALL 
ST. J. (July 9, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303734204577466453629079534, 
[https://perma.cc/862Y-KL4D] (explaining tracking error and how it can vary among index funds). 
11 See, e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 7, at 90 (arguing that “index funds have 
especially poor incentives to engage in stewardship activities that could improve governance and 
increase value”); Lund, supra note 7, at 495. 
12 See Robertson, supra note 2, at 821 (explaining the nature of bespoke indices). 
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the index or deviating from that index.13 Finally, although many passive funds 
have very low fees, those fees vary substantially.14 
We next explain that, to understand passive funds, it is necessary to 
understand the institutional context in which they operate. The existing 
literature analyzes the behavior and incentives of passive investors at the level 
of the individual mutual fund but overlooks the fact that an individual mutual 
fund is simply a pool of assets.15 The mutual fund’s actions are undertaken by 
third parties who have a contractual relationship with the fund.16 These third 
parties—whom we term “passive investors” to distinguish their actions from 
those of the fund itself—are the fund sponsor, which establishes the fund, 
and the investment adviser, which makes the fund’s operational decisions and 
is typically a related entity.17 
The institutional context of passive funds can therefore vary widely, 
depending on the structure and incentives of those who operate the funds. In 
the case of Fidelity, for example, Fidelity Investments, the fund sponsor, is a 
privately owned company which, in addition to offering over 500 mutual 
funds, designs and administers employer-sponsored retirement plans and 
offers brokerage and other investment services.18 Fidelity Management & 
Research Company is the investment advisor for Fidelity’s family of mutual 
funds.19 Conversely, BlackRock, Inc. is a publicly traded corporation that is 
the sponsor of the BlackRock mutual funds, and its funds are managed by 
BlackRock Capital Investment Advisors LLC.20 For simplicity, we will 
generally refer collectively to the fund sponsor and the investment adviser as 
the sponsor, but it is worth noting that they are independent entities with 
differing incentives.21 
 
13 See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. 
14 For example, the expense ratio for Fidelity’s large cap index fund is zero. See Sommer, supra 
note 10. The expense ratio for T.Rowe Price’s Equity Index 500 Fund is 21 basis points. Equity Index 
500 Fund, T.ROWE PRICE, https://www.troweprice.com/personal-investing/tools/fund-
research/PREIX [https://perma.cc/AGT2-AED2] (last visited August 6, 2019). 
15 See Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 
1968 (2010). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 See Fidelity by the Numbers: Corporate Statistics, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/about-
fidelity/fidelity-by-numbers/corporate-statistics [https://perma.cc/GUQ8-CD2B] (last visited June 
11, 2019). 
19 Id. 
20 BlackRock Advisors LLC is the sole managing partner of BlackRock Capital Investment 
Advisors LLC and is a wholly owned subsidiary of BlackRock, Inc. See BlackRock Investment 
Management LLC, Client Brochure, Form ADV Part 2A, at 33 (2019), https://www.lfg.com/wcs-
static/pdf/BlackRock%20Investment%20Management%20LLC.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX5M-MDBE]. 
21 Fund sponsors are sometimes also referred to as fund complexes or fund families. 
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The incentives of sponsors, rather than merely those of the pool of assets, 
drive fund behavior. Most significantly, sponsors normally manage an entire 
family of funds, and the family usually includes a mixture of passive and 
actively managed funds. The sponsor’s business model involves maximizing the 
revenue from the entire family.22 That revenue, in turn, is a product of both 
assets under management and fund fees. To illustrate this principle at the 
passive investor level, the competition is between Fidelity and Vanguard, not 
between Fidelity’s Large Cap index fund and the Fidelity Magellan Fund.23 
Similarly, it is important to distinguish between a mutual fund and the 
shareholders who invest in that fund. Although passive funds are locked into 
their investments, their shareholders are not. Like all mutual fund 
shareholders, investors in index funds can exit at any time by selling their 
shares and, when they do so, they receive the net asset value of their 
ownership interest.24 As a result of this exit option, mutual funds compete 
for investors on an ongoing basis. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that 
index funds compete for investors only against other index funds that track 
the same index. Rather, index funds compete with other passive (i.e. index) 
funds,25 with actively managed funds,26 and with other investment options. 
This competition is not based solely on cost. Since mutual fund inflows are 
based on fund performance,27 passive investors risk losing assets if the 
performance of passive funds lags that of actively managed funds on a cost-
adjusted basis.28 
 
22 We observe that the other components of the business of mutual fund sponsors may affect 
their incentives and operational decisions as well. For example, commentators have argued that a 
fund’s investment advisor may face a conflict of interest in voting the securities of a portfolio 
company when the advisor “also manages or seeks to manage the retirement plan assets of [the] 
company.” See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered 
Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6565 (Feb. 7, 2003). 
23 Incentives operate somewhat differently at the level of the individual portfolio manager. 
Because passive investors, especially the Big Three, often vote and engage at the level of the fund 
family, these incentives do not present a significant concern for our analysis. 
24 See, e.g., John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee 
Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 89 (2010) (explaining the mechanisms by 
which mutual fund shareholders exit at net asset value). 
25 For example, Adriana Robertson collected data indicating that, in 2017, U.S. mutual funds 
tracked 555 separate indexes. Robertson, supra note 2, at 815. 
26 For evidence that active funds compete with passive ones, see generally Martijn Cremers, 
Miguel A. Ferreora, Pedro Matos & Laura Starks, Indexing and Active Fund Management: 
International Evidence, 120 J. FIN. ECON. 539 (2016). 
27 See, e.g., Jonathan Lewellen & Katharina Lewellen, Institutional Investors and Corporate 
Governance: The Incentive to Be Engaged 2 (Tuck Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 3265761, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3265761 (reporting that “a one percentage point increase in an institution’s 
benchmark-adjusted quarterly return predicts a 1.29 percentage point (standard error of 0.12) 
increase in net inflow over the subsequent ten quarters”). 
28 See, e.g., Susan E.K. Christoffersen, David K. Musto & Russ Wermers, Investor Flows to Asset 
Managers: Causes and Consequences, 6 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 289, 290 (2014) (reviewing empirical 
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In addition, a mutual fund shareholder is typically the customer of the 
entire mutual fund family. People who invest in mutual funds often invest 
within one family of funds.29 Investing in a single fund family offers 
advantages such as a consolidated statement and easy mechanisms for 
transferring assets between funds.30 As a result, the business model of a 
passive investor can be understood as competing both for assets and for 
investors. This explains why it may be rational for Fidelity to offer four index 
funds that charge no management fee at all.31 Even though it does not receive 
any direct revenue from the assets that are invested in those funds,32 Fidelity 
may use these funds to attract customers who then invest in other Fidelity 
mutual funds. Indeed, when Fidelity began offering its zero fee funds, the 
stock of other predominantly active fund sponsors suffered.33 
Understanding the business model of passive investors leads to a 
comprehensive theory of their incentives and behavior, a theory that we set 
forth in Part I. We first show that competition with other fund sponsors gives 
passive investors, especially the largest ones, incentives to engage in 
stewardship, and that fund families that manage a substantial amount of 
 
literature on the factors that influence the flow of funds into and out of mutual funds); Lewellen & 
Lewellen, supra note 27, at 2 (concluding that “[in]flows contribute significantly to institutions’ 
incentives”). 
29 See, e.g., Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber & T. Clifton Green, The Impact of Mutual Fund 
Family Membership on Investor Risk, 42 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 257, 257 (2007) 
(“Individuals often make all of their mutual fund investments within one family of mutual funds.”). 
30 See, e.g., Joshua Kennan, What Is a Mutual Fund Family?, THE BALANCE (Apr. 26, 2019), 
https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-a-mutual-fund-family-358178 [https://perma.cc/7SPE-73WR] 
(describing the advantages of investing within a single fund sponsor). 
31 Fidelity initially offered two zero-fee index funds. See Eric Rosenbaum, Fidelity’s New No-
fee Index Funds Bring in $1 Billion in First Month, CNBC (Sept. 4, 2018, 3:44 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/04/fidelity-offers-first-ever-free-index-funds-and-1-billion-
follows.html [https://perma.cc/8D97-RBSK]. It subsequently expanded its offerings to include four 
zero fee funds. See We’re Raising the Bar on Value, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/mutual-
funds/investing-ideas/index-funds?imm_pid=700000001009773&immid=100611&imm_eid=ep3
5415530159&gclid=CjwKCAiA4t_iBRApEiwAn-vt-ymCpDfC43wE3RjhNoxvZN-L7XKqa0qhwV
QHHsP2TlLXW69W-VWIwRoCmp8QAvD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds [https://perma.cc/BWF3-77X4] 
(last visited June 11, 2019). 
32 Fund sponsors receive additional revenue from the funds they manage both through 
commissions charged on securities transactions and through securities lending. See Sommer, supra 
note 10. These revenues are primarily a product of the borrowing demand for the securities held in 
the fund’s portfolio. See, e.g., Miles Weiss, Fidelity Drops Goldman by Bringing Securities Lending In-
House, BLOOMBERG (May 14, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-
14/fidelity-drops-goldman-by-bringing-securities-lending-in-house [https://perma.cc/9DZ8-CL6K] 
(explaining that mutual fund sponsors can earn high fees from lending stocks that are in demand by 
short sellers). 
33 See Rosenbaum, supra note 31 (“Some of the fund companies hit hardest by the Fidelity 
move were publicly traded managers known primarily for active mutual funds, such as Federated 
Investors, Legg Mason and Franklin Resources, which were down more than 5 percent on the day 
Fidelity announced the no-fee funds in early August.”). 
 
2019] The New Titans of Wall Street 25 
assets in passive funds have a distinctive need to preserve the attraction of 
passive funds relative to active funds on a cost-adjusted basis. 
Specifically, active funds compete based on their ability to generate alpha 
through the use of their investment discretion—choosing particular securities 
to under- and over-weight relative to their benchmark and trading those 
securities on the basis of firm-specific information.34 In the extreme case, an 
active manager who identifies fund-specific problems can exercise market 
discipline through exit. Passive investors lack that option, and, as a result, 
they face a potential lemons problem.35 If active managers sell or underweight 
the securities of low-quality firms, and passive funds are forced to hold the 
entire market, they will underperform active funds even on a cost-adjusted 
basis. To stay competitive, passive investors can engage in broad-based efforts 
to improve the overall performance of the market and address cross-cutting 
issues such as corporate governance, risk management, sustainability, and 
cybersecurity. 
Using the last as an example, an active fund portfolio manager who 
perceives cybersecurity as a risk likely to impact firm performance 
substantially can overweight the stock of the bank with the best cybersecurity 
system and underweight the laggard. Passive investors, who are forced to hold 
the entire industry or market, instead must take actions such as increasing 
market-wide attention to cybersecurity in order to reduce the comparative 
advantage of active funds. 
More broadly, governance initiatives by passive investors such as 
improved board quality, conflict of interest policies, and appropriately 
structured executive compensation plans target underperformers in an effort 
to avoid events that are likely to highlight the value of active management. 
Investors in S&P 500 Index funds, like those which were forced to continue 
holding Enron stock as it lost more than 99% of its value before being 
removed from the index,36 suffered substantial losses that investors in some 
 
34 See, e.g., Del Guercio & Reuter, supra note 3, at 1674 (providing evidence that active funds 
expend resources to generate alpha when investor inflows are responsive to alpha). 
35 Institutional investors are well aware of this limitation and note it frequently in 
communications with investors and firms. See, e.g., Annual Letter to CEOs, Lawrence D. Fink, 
CEO, BlackRock, A Sense of Purpose (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/
investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/NCL5-XR26] (“In managing our index 
funds, however, BlackRock cannot express its disapproval by selling the company’s securities as long 
as that company remains in the relevant index. As a result, our responsibility to engage and vote is 
more important than ever.”). 
36 See Lawrence C. Strauss, The Enron Verdict: Always Diversify, BARRON’S (May 8, 2006, 12:01 
AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/SB114687148778645481 [https://perma.cc/5TAS-8AW7] (noting 
the losses suffered by investors in the S&P 500 index fund when Enron collapsed). Standard & Poors 
did not remove Enron stock from the S&P 500 index until late November 2001, when the company’s 
stock was trading for less than one dollar per share. See Luisa Beltran, Enron Failure May Be Biggest, 
 
26 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 17 
active funds were able to avoid.37 To reduce the frequency of events like these, 
passive investors have incentives to try to address these problems, largely by 
improving corporate governance. 
We also show that the business model of passive investors makes their 
engagement cost-effective. Passive funds enjoy economies of scale which 
enable them to manage very large pools of assets at low cost. Because passive 
investors vote and engage at the fund family level, they are able to aggregate 
the size of their substantial holdings as well as the information provided by 
all their investments and to spread the cost of obtaining information across 
their entire portfolio. Finally, becoming informed is more readily justified for 
large passive investors because of their role as pivotal voters. 
This theory is borne out in reality. In Part II, we document the emerging 
engagement by passive funds and their increasing influence with respect to 
firm-specific and market-wide firm governance. We show that passive 
investors have responded to the incentives to identify—on a system-wide 
basis—governance weaknesses that contribute to underperformance and to 
seek to reduce governance risk. We also document how passive investors are 
coordinating with and mediating the efforts of shareholder activists. We cite 
the evidence, albeit preliminary, from a number of empirical studies which 
show that the effect of this behavior has been to improve both firm 
governance and performance.38 
In Part III, we consider the implications of our theory for corporate law 
and financial regulation. Specifically, we show that, although proposals to 
disenfranchise passive funds due to governance concerns are misguided, the 
rise of passive funds raises other potential concerns that, in some cases, have 
been overlooked by the literature. The growth of passive investing has led to 
 
CNN MONEY (Nov. 29, 2001, 5:40 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2001/11/29/companies/enron/ 
[https://perma.cc/QZH6-22SX]. 
37 See Strauss, supra note 36 (stating that, although some actively managed funds held Enron 
through its collapse, others were able to reduce or exit their positions and avoid significant losses). 
38 See, e.g., Ian R. Appel, Todd A. Gormley & Donald B. Keim, Passive Investors, Not Passive 
Owners, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 111, 114 (2016) (finding that the presence of increased ownership by passive 
investors results in more independent directors, removal of takeover defenses, more equal voting 
rights, and better long-term performance, but reduces the likelihood of being targeted by activists); 
Ian R. Appel, Todd A. Gormley & Donald B. Keim, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: The Effect of 
Passive Investors on Activism, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 2720, 2723 (2019) (finding that higher passive 
ownership is associated with more vigorous hedge fund activism seeking director positions, proxy 
fights, settlements, and the sale of the firm); Andrew Bird & Stephen A. Karolyi, Do Institutional 
Investors Demand Public Disclosure?, 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 3245, 3245-48 (2016) (reporting that 
increased ownership by institutional investors “significantly increases the information content of 8-
K filings” and attributing this result to the “disclosure preferences of relatively passive investors”); 
Audra L. Boone & Joshua T. White, The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Firm Transparency and 
Information Production, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 508, 508 (2015) (demonstrating that increased passive 
ownership is associated with “greater management disclosure, analyst following, and liquidity, 
resulting in lower information asymmetry”). 
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an increased concentration of publicly traded stock in the hands of a small 
group of sponsors who can potentially use their immense influence over these 
companies to pursue pecuniary or nonpecuniary private benefits of control.39 
Passive fund sponsors also face distinctive issues with respect to conflicts of 
interests. We consider these concerns and conclude that, although they bear 
watching both with respect to the interests of fund customers and the 
economy as a whole, they do not at present warrant regulatory changes. 
I. A THEORY OF PASSIVE INVESTOR INCENTIVES 
In this Part, we offer a comprehensive theory of the incentives of passive 
investors. In Section A, we provide critical background on the institutional 
context, a context that has been largely ignored by existing academic research. 
In Section B, we explain that passive investors compete for customers and 
that this competition is not limited to fee minimization. In Section C, we 
show that competition among funds incentivizes passive investors to take 
measures to improve the governance of companies in their portfolio on a 
system-wide basis. 
A. The Institutional Context of Passive Funds 
A mutual fund or ETF40 is a pool of assets—assets that may include 
stocks, bonds, cash, and other types of investments.41 The value of the mutual 
fund, commonly described as net asset value (NAV), is the value of the assets 
owned by the fund divided by the number of outstanding shares.42 Mutual 
funds have no independent operations or employees, and the operational 
decisions of the fund are made by external service providers.43 Funds 
themselves do not make money—the fees that they collect go, in part, to pay 
for services such as investment advice and administrative support, with the 
remainder going to the fund sponsor.44 The mutual fund sponsor is the entity, 
typically a financial services company,45 that establishes and sells mutual fund 
 
39 For an extended analysis of this concern, see generally Coates, supra note 8, at 13-14. 
40 For purposes of this Article our references to mutual funds include references to ETFs 
unless otherwise specified. 
41 See Fisch, supra note 15. 
42 Jill Fisch & Eric Roiter, A Floating NAV for Money Market Funds: Fix or Fantasy?, 2012 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1003, 1008. 
43 See Fisch, supra note 15. 
44 Shares in the mutual fund are offered by fund sponsors, which offer investors a menu of 
different types of funds. See generally Mutual Funds, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 14, 2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersmutfundhtm.html [https://perma.cc/4AEG-U3C9]. 
45 Most fund sponsors are independent fund advisers, but mutual funds are also sold by banks, 
insurance companies, and brokerage firms. See INV. CO. INST., 2016 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT 
BOOK 15 (56th ed. 2016). 
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shares. It is important to distinguish the interests of the fund itself from those 
of its sponsor.46 Sponsors, with the exception of Vanguard,47 are typically 
public companies such as BlackRock48 or private companies, such as Fidelity 
Investments.49 In either case, the fees charged by the fund, minus the costs of 
operating the fund, generate a profit for the sponsor’s shareholders. The goal 
of the sponsor is to maximize this profit. 
Funds charge their investors an annual fee or expense ratio which is 
calculated as a percentage of the assets that a particular fund manages—their 
“assets under management.”50 Expense ratios vary substantially within the 
industry and even within a single mutual fund sponsor. As a result, a small 
fund that charges a higher fee may be more profitable to a sponsor than a 
fund with a very low fee and more assets under management. The offerings 
of fund sponsors differ substantially but typically include a mixture of passive 
and active funds.51 Some sponsors such as Vanguard specialize in passively 
managed funds;52 others, such as Fidelity53 and T. Rowe Price, focus more on 
 
46 See, e.g., John Morley, Too Big to Be Activist, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1417 (2019) (stating that 
it is “easy to conflate Fidelity with its various clients, but we must nevertheless keep them 
conceptually distinct . . . .”). 
47 Vanguard is a special case. The Vanguard Group, the fund sponsor, is owned by its mutual funds, 
and the sponsor therefore provides services to the funds at cost. See Why Ownership Matters, VANGUARD, 
https://about.vanguard.com/what-sets-vanguard-apart/why-ownership-matters/ [https://perma.cc/3BQ5-
C866] (last visited June 24, 2019). 
48 See Our History, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/about-us/blackrock-
history [https://perma.cc/3WAE-PJGR] (last visited June 12, 2019). 
49 See Tim McLaughlin, How the Owners of Fidelity Get Richer at Everyday Investors’ Expense, 
REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-
fidelity-family/ [https://perma.cc/B7Y2-R4CN]. 
50 Some funds also charge other types of fees such as loads and 12b-1 fees. See Fisch, supra note 
15, at 1973, 2000. This Article focuses on the fund expense ratio, which reflects the ongoing cost to 
investors and the ongoing revenue to fund sponsors. 
51 Sponsors vary tremendously in their businesses. Some sponsors limit their business to 
mutual funds, some engage in a broader range of asset management activities, and others engage in 
other activities that may include commercial banking, investment banking and more. Deutsche Bank 
and Goldman Sachs, for example, offer ETFs. See Asjylyn Loder, ETFs Provide Some Good News at 
Deutsche Bank, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/etfs-provide-
some-good-news-at-deutsche-bank-1488191402 [https://perma.cc/AUK3-J6YC]; Asjylyn Loder, 
Goldman’s $3 Billion Drop in the ETF Bucket, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2, 2017, 6:57 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/goldmans-3-billion-drop-in-the-etf-bucket-1488483434 
[https://perma.cc/33A9-DEER]. 
52 Even Vanguard, which is typically considered a pure passive investor, offers a mix of active 
and passive funds. For example, as of December 2018, Vanguard offered 129 mutual funds, of which, 
according to its website, 80 were actively managed funds. See Vanguard Believes in Active Management, 
VANGUARD (Dec. 7, 2018), https://institutional.vanguard.com/VGApp/iip/site/institutional/research
commentary/article/InvComActiveMgmtInfographic2018 [https://perma.cc/NR4H-C2RH]. Active 
assets account for approximately 30% of Vanguard’s total assets under management, with a dollar value 
of more than $1 trillion. Id. 
53 As of early 2019, Fidelity offered investors over 200 mutual funds of which 27 were index 
funds. See Why Invest in Fidelity Index Funds?, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/mutual-
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active management.54 Consequently, the role of passive funds and their 
economic significance within a fund sponsor’s overall business model vary. 
To understand a fund sponsor’s incentives, it is critical to understand the 
sponsor’s competitive strategy and the relative role of its passive funds and 
active funds in generating revenues. Fund sponsors compete on a variety of 
dimensions—the number and type of funds they offer, the expertise of their 
fund managers, the user-friendliness of their websites, and the types of other 
products and services they offer. 
Some sponsors compete largely on cost. Vanguard’s business model, for 
example, is driven by an effort to be the low-cost leader overall, and Vanguard 
advertises the fact that its average fund expense ratio is well below the 
industry average.55 This competitive strategy applies to both Vanguard’s index 
funds and its actively managed funds.56 In contrast, fund sponsors that charge 
higher fees can generate substantial revenues even if they attract a far smaller 
volume of assets. 
Sponsors also differ as to the mix of their operations. BlackRock, which is 
currently the largest global asset manager, with almost $6 trillion in assets 
under management, manages two thirds of that money in passive funds.57 Yet 
the fees generated by BlackRock’s actively managed products are roughly 
 
funds/fidelity-funds/why-index-funds [https://perma.cc/EHQ3-Q7WQ] (last visited June 12, 2019). 
Fidelity’s index funds include domestic and international equity funds, bond funds, and a real estate 
fund. Id. Fidelity customers are shifting an increasing percentage of their assets to the index funds. 
See Tirthankar Chakraborty, Vanguard vs Fidelity: Fee War Heats Up, NASDAQ (Aug. 25, 2017, 10:45 AM), 
https://www.nasdaq.com/article/vanguard-vs-fidelity-fee-war-heats-up-cm837199 
[https://perma.cc/6KAD-DCSF]. 
54 See Active Management, T. ROWE PRICE, https://corporate.troweprice.com/ccw/jsp/pages/
active-management/investment-approach.jsp [https://perma.cc/G6HT-U77S] (last visited June 12, 
2019) (describing T. Rowe Price’s commitment to “disciplined, active investment management”). 
Even T. Rowe Price, however, offers several index funds. See, e.g., Mutual Fund Research Tool, T. 
ROWE PRICE, https://www3.troweprice.com/fb2/mfpathways/pathways.otc?facets=domesticStock,
intStock [https://perma.cc/EKR4-X9JZ] (last visited June 12, 2019) (describing T. Rowe Price 
Equity Index 500 Fund). 
55 See Why Ownership Matters, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/what-sets-vanguard-
apart/why-ownership-matters/ [https://perma.cc/3BQ5-C866] (last visited June 12, 2019) (noting 
that Vanguard’s average asset-weighted expense ratio in 2018 was .10% and that the industry average 
was .58%); see also Owen Walker, Vanguard’s Campaign to Drive Down Fees Runs Out of Road, FIN. 
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/e35ba836-291f-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0 
[https://perma.cc/2B8H-A3YA] (stating that Vanguard “has led the way in cutting fees over the past 
decade. . . .”). 
56 See Erin Arvedlund, Vanguard Crushing the Competition with Largest Fund Inflows So Far in 
2019, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 27, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/business/vanguard-jack-bogle-
passive-active-mutual-fund-etf-20190527.html [https://perma.cc/NYV4-N4GE] (describing inflows 
into Vanguard’s actively managed funds as “index-like fees”). 
57 See Chris Flood, BlackRock’s Rivers of Gold from Active Management, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/f62ed0c2-ada1-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4 [https://perma.cc/8DU2-FDFE]. 
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equivalent to those generated by its much larger passive funds.58 Fidelity, 
which is known primarily for its active funds, offers four passive funds that 
do not charge a fee at all.59 Critically, each fund sponsor offers a different 
menu of fund options. Even primarily passive investors offer funds that track 
different indexes and, as a result, each sponsor holds a somewhat different 
mix of portfolio companies. In addition, a sponsor may adjust the mixture of 
funds that it offers in response to business conditions or market 
developments. State Street, which is known for its indexing, recently 
announced that current market conditions may favor shifting assets to 
actively managed funds.60 For a given family, the business model involves 
both navigating the potential loss of assets to other fund families and 
maximizing the potential revenue from existing customers.61 Finally, it is also 
necessary to know how sticky assets are within a fund family in order to 
determine the extent to which a passive fund risks losing assets to active funds 
within its own family or to funds sold by other sponsors. 
Sponsors’ business decisions are made in the context of a highly 
competitive market.62 As of the end of 2018, there were 846 fund sponsors.63 
These sponsors competed to offer over 17,700 different mutual funds to 
investors.64 The asset class of passive funds itself demonstrates substantial 
variation.65 Although the term “passive fund” typically evokes an S&P 500 
 
58 See id. (reporting that BlackRock’s active funds generated $1.32 billion in the third quarter 
of 2017 and that its passive funds generated $1.33 billion). 
59 See Why Invest in Fidelity Index Funds?, supra note 53. 
60 See Bailey McCann, Surprising Cry from an Index Firm: ‘Go Active,’ WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2018, 
10:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/suprising-cry-from-an-index-firm-go-active-1523239621 
[https://perma.cc/63Q2-Q9FU]. 
61 For some fund sponsors, a cheap index fund can be a loss leader designed to get investors to 
bring their entire portfolio to the fund family with the goal of attracting investment in the complex’s 
other more costly fund options. See, e.g., Ben Johnson, Penny-Pinching Index Fund Investors May Pay 
a Price, MORNINGSTAR (Apr. 14, 2017), http://www.morningstar.com/articles/802512/
pennypinching-index-fund-investors-may-pay-a-price.html [https://perma.cc/3Y7W-SKHC] (“In 
many settings, these low-cost building blocks are simply loss leaders, a cheap gallon of milk meant 
to entice consumers into the store in hopes that they’ll grab some Cheetos and a pack of gum before 
they get to the counter.”). 
62 See generally John C. Coates IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund 
Industry: Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 153 (2007) (“[R]eview[ing] the 
structure, performance and dynamics of the mutual fund industry, and show[ing that] they are 
consistent with competition”). 
63 See INV. CO. INST., 2019 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 43 (59th ed. 2019). 
64 At the end of 2018, there were 17,707 mutual funds in the U.S. See id. at 32. 
65 In 2018, for example, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listed for trading the NYSE 
Pickens Oil Response ETF, an ETF that “reflects the investment philosophy of legendary oilman 
and energy investor T. Boone Pickens[,]” but is nonetheless classified as an index fund. See, e.g., Tom 
DiChristopher, Legendary Oilman T. Boone Pickens Inspires New ETF with the ‘BOON’ Fund, CNBC 
(Feb. 28, 2018, 11:28 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/28/legendary-oilman-t-boone-pickens-
inspires-new-etf-with-the-boon-fund.html [https://perma.cc/7N98-BQCD]. 
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index fund, the universe of market indexes has exploded to the point where 
there are now more indexes than publicly traded U.S. stocks.66 The new 
indexes, many of which are created for a single mutual fund sponsor seeking 
to offer a new product, provide a way of converting what has traditionally 
been an active investment strategy into a rule-based approach,67 using custom 
criteria such as high dividends or low volatility.68 Although the costs of most 
passive funds are lower than those of active funds, not all are low cost, and 
many charge much higher fees than S&P 500 index funds.69 The proliferation 
of indexes and index-based investment strategies has led some commentators 
to argue that there is, in fact, “no such thing as passive investing.”70  
B. Passive Fund Competition 
Competition among funds is commonly perceived as providing sponsors 
with incentives to engage with their portfolio companies.71 Critics of passive 
funds, however, argue that, because passive investors compete with each other 
primarily on fees and tracking error, they lack a reason to try to increase firm 
value.72 This conventional view focuses on the competition between passive 
funds that track the same index. It assumes that an investor’s preference to 
purchase a passive fund that tracks a specific index is exogenously 
 
66 See There Are Now More Indexes Than Stocks, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 12, 2017, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-12/there-are-now-more-indexes-than-stocks 
[https://perma.cc/8XVK-VZ29]. 
67 Robertson, supra note 2, at 831. There are also funds which contain passive components but 
allow for a measure of active investing. See, e.g., Fidelity Launches First Two Sustainability-Focused Index 
Funds, FIDELITY (May 15, 2017), https:www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/institutional-investment-
management/first-two-sustainability-focused-index-funds [https://perma.cc/7JBC-VM2K] (“Each 
fund will attempt to replicate the performance of its respective index, before expenses, by normally 
investing at least 80% of its assets in securities included in the index.”). 
68 Some of these strategies, which are labeled as passive, are termed “factor investing” or “smart 
beta” strategies. See JASON STONEBERG & BRADLEY SMITH, INVESCO WHITE PAPER SERIES: 
THE FACTS BEHIND FACTOR PERFORMANCE 2 (2019), https://www.invesco.com/static/us/financial-
professional/contentdetail?contentId=634ff6163339f410VgnVCM100000c2f1bf0aRCRD 
[https://perma.cc/R38W-79LB] (describing factor investing as “a rules-based methodology that uses 
factor selection and/or alternative weighting in an effort to outperform a benchmark, reduce portfolio 
risk, or both” and smart beta as ETFs that “are based on indexes that are not market-cap-weighted”). 
69 See, e.g., Anora Mahmudova, Pioneer of Smart-beta Investing Warns Strategy is Being Abused, 
MARKETWATCH (Aug. 11, 2016, 10:11 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-pioneer-of-
smart-beta-investing-is-flashing-warning-signs-2016-08-10 [https://perma.cc/4UF7-NHAV] (warning 
that the “relatively higher fees [of smart beta funds] would eat into any future returns”). 
70 Dani Burger, Investing in Index Funds Is No Longer Passive, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 27, 2018, 3:52 
PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-27/passive-becomes-the-new-active-as-
indexing-rules-everything [https://perma.cc/5X6H-D4SB]. 
71 See Lewellen & Lewellen, supra note 27, at 2-3. 
72 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 8 (manuscript at 19) (“Competition with other index 
funds gives index fund managers precisely zero additional incentive to invest in stewardship for any 
of their portfolio companies.”). 
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determined, and thus, that passive funds that track this index compete to 
attract investors based exclusively on cost73 and tracking error.74 
This view, however, is incomplete. Passive funds, and more accurately the 
sponsors that offer these funds, compete for investor assets not only with each 
other but also with passive funds that track different indexes as well as active 
funds. Furthermore, funds compete for investor assets based not only on fees, 
but also on performance. As we argue in the next Section, this competition 
provides passive investors with the incentive to improve the governance of 
companies in their portfolio. 
Although the finance literature has documented the competition between 
active and passive funds,75 it has not examined the dynamics of this 
competition or its effect on passive fund incentives. The incentive of the fund 
sponsor, however, is to use its menu of fund offerings to attract assets and 
customers from other fund sponsors. Sponsors that primarily offer actively 
managed mutual funds, as well as hedge funds, seek to generate alpha, a 
return that exceeds that available by investing in a passively managed 
benchmark.76 They do this by investing in firm-specific research and trading 
on the basis of that research, overweighting some stocks and underweighting 
others relative to their benchmark portfolio.77 For example, a portfolio 
manager who researched a company and determined that it was a massive 
fraud would underweight or sell its stock, hoping to benefit when the market 
identified the fraud.78 Active funds incur higher costs due to this research and 
charge higher fees. Investors are willing to pay these fees based on the hope 
that these funds’ stock-picking activities will produce higher returns, net of 
fees, than the benchmark portfolio.79 
 
73 See, e.g., Chakraborty, supra note 53 (describing competitive cost-cutting between Fidelity 
and Vanguard’s S&P 500 index funds). 
74 See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 10 (observing that returns of two otherwise identical index 
funds can differ due to tracking error). 
75 See generally Cremers et al., supra note 26 (finding that the increased presence of index funds 
reduces fees and raises alpha for active funds). 
76 See Paolo Guasoni, Gur Huberman & Zhenyu Wang, Performance Maximization of Actively 
Managed Funds, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 574, 575 (2011) (explaining alpha and discussing its significance in 
financial services). 
77 See Robert F. Stambaugh, Skill and Fees in Active Management 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 26027, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3412701 (“Active investment 
managers seek to outperform a passive benchmark portfolio by identifying and trading securities 
likely to over- or under-perform.”). 
78 The paradigmatic example of this occurred in the months preceding Enron’s collapse. See, e.g., 
Jen Wieczner, Hedge Fund Manager Who Spotted Fraud at Enron Calls Tesla ‘The Anti-Amazon,’ FORTUNE 
(Sept. 13, 2016, 2:52 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/09/13/tesla-amazon-stock-solarcity-jim-chanos/ 
[https://perma.cc/QD6S-A83D] (identifying Jim Chanos as the hedge fund manager who famously 
identified the Enron fraud before the market and profited by selling Enron stock short). 
79 See, e.g., K. J. Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active Is Your Fund Manager? A New 
Measure That Predicts Performance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329, 3329 (2009) (demonstrating that 
 
2019] The New Titans of Wall Street 33 
If investors believe that passive funds cannot offer a better rate of return 
than active funds, they will flee to active funds, and vice versa. Indeed, we 
believe the substantial recent inflows to passive funds are a response, in part, 
to extensive media reports that active funds underperform passive funds.80 
More broadly, investors will invest with the fund sponsor that offers the most 
attractive menu of funds on a cost-adjusted basis. The finance literature has 
consistently shown that mutual fund assets flows respond to past 
performance.81 It also provides reasons to believe that performance-chasing 
by mutual fund investors is reasonable.82 That this competition persists is 
evidenced by the fact that some actively managed funds with strong 
performance both continue to attract substantial new assets and charge fees 
that are considerably higher than those charged by index funds.83 Even with 
the dramatic recent inflows into passive funds, at least some customers 
continue to believe that active funds will produce higher returns, net of fees. 
Moreover, mutual fund investors are not locked into a particular mutual 
fund.84 Instead, they have an ongoing option to exit the fund at fair value or 
 
mutual funds whose holdings differ most from their benchmark tend to outperform that benchmark 
net of fees). 
80 See, e.g., Peter Coy, Index Funds Are King, But Some Indexers Are Passive-Aggressive, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 24, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-
24/index-funds-are-king-but-some-indexers-are-passive-aggressive [https://perma.cc/QW83-
PQDA] (“[In 2019], assets in passively managed U.S. equity funds are likely to surpass assets in 
actively managed ones. . . . Through August, only 17 percent of actively managed funds in the U.S. 
‘large blend’ category had beaten the performance of their passive peers over 20 years.”). 
81 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Mutual Funds in Equilibrium, 9 ANN. 
REV. FIN. ECON. 147, 148 (2017) (“[F]und flows into mutual funds are known to be highly predictable 
on the basis of past performance . . . .”); C. Wei Li, Ashish Tiwari & Lin Tong, Investment Decisions 
Under Ambiguity: Evidence from Mutual Fund Investor Behavior, 63 MGMT. SCI. 2509, 2509 (2017) 
(describing “the well-documented phenomenon of performance chasing by fund investors”). 
82 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Berk & Richard C. Green, Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in 
Rational Markets, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1269, 1270-71 (2004) (providing an economic explanation for 
investors to chase past performance by mutual funds). Indeed, scholars have documented that assets 
flow at an increased rate into a successful fund, but because the fund adviser’s ideas are finite, 
eventually investors will no longer receive an excess return. See, e.g., David C. Brown & Shaun 
William Davies, Moral Hazard in Active Asset Management, 125 J. FIN. ECON. 311, 313 (2017) 
(explaining that empirical evidence supports the conclusion that “truly active funds experience 
decreasing-returns-to-scale”). 
83 See, e.g., Lee Conrad & Andrew Shilling, Fund Flows: Who’s the Big Winner YTD?, FIN. 
PLANNING (Dec. 13, 2017, 3:52 PM), https://www.financial-planning.com/slideshow/mutual-funds-
and-etfs-with-the-biggest-net-flows-ytd#slide-1 [http://perma.cc/L3HU-7FE6] (documenting the 
top 20 funds with substantial inflows in 2017, a number of which were actively managed funds with 
higher fees). 
84 Concededly, there is a documented stickiness to investment through fund families and 
defined benefit plans. See generally Anne M. Tucker, Locked In: The Competitive Disadvantage of 
Citizen Shareholders, 125 YALE L.J. F. 163, 172-178 (2015) (reviewing structural obstacles to switching 
mutual funds within a retirement plan). 
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at NAV.85 In addition, a fund’s NAV is unaffected by investors’ expectations 
about the fund’s future fees or performance.86 
Another dimension of the competition among funds is the fact that a 
substantial percentage of all mutual fund investing occurs within the 
framework of employer-sponsored 401(k) retirement plans.87 These plans 
typically give participants a menu of investment options that include passive 
funds, actively managed funds, stable value funds, and other products.88 The 
employer chooses the investment options available to participants. Two 
aspects of retirement investing affect the market for mutual funds. First, 
because of its fiduciary obligations under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),89 an employer is likely to prefer a plan menu 
that includes at least some low cost options.90 Courts have generally upheld 
plans that include higher cost options, however, so long as the overall plan 
provides participants with sufficient choice.91 Second, investors can generally 
switch between funds in retirement plans without paying any taxes.92 
The institutional reality under which the sponsors of passive funds 
compete for investors sharply contrasts with the view of some scholars that 
competition provides passive investors with little reason to care about the 
performance of companies in their portfolio. Our analysis suggests that 
passive fund sponsors compete both with other passive fund sponsors and 
with active fund sponsors and that they compete along the dimensions of both 
 
85 See Fisch & Roiter, supra note 42, at 1008 (“A fundamental component of mutual fund 
regulation requires mutual funds . . . to allow investors to redeem their shares at any time at the 
NAV of the shares.”). 
86 See, e.g., Morley & Curtis, supra note 24, at 89 (explaining that a mutual fund’s “NAV is 
unaffected by expectations about future fees or portfolio changes[,]” or even about expected 
future returns). 
87 See, e.g., 2019 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 63, at 180 (“The $8.2 trillion 
in mutual fund retirement assets made up 46 percent of all mutual fund assets at year-end 2018.”). 
88 See, e.g., BRIGHTSCOPE & INV. CO. INST., THE BRIGHTSCOPE/ICI DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION PLAN PROFILE: A CLOSE LOOK AT 401(K) PLANS, 2014 32 (2016) (reporting that 
in 2014 the average 401(k) plan offered investors 21 investment options, counting target date funds 
as a single investment option). 
89 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C). 
90 See Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1829 (2015) (holding that employer is under a 
continuing duty to monitor and improve the investment options in its 401(k) plan). For an overview 
of employer obligations under ERISA, see Jill E. Fisch, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Kristin Firth, The 
Knowledge Gap in Workplace Retirement Investing and the Role of Professional Advisors, 66 DUKE L.J. 
633, 643-48 (2016). 
91 On the typical structure of 401(k) plans and judicial oversight of the composition of such 
plans, see Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? An 
Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 605, 614-19 (2014). 
92 See, e.g., Kent Thune, How to Reduce Taxes on Mutual Funds, THE BALANCE (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://www.thebalance.com/how-to-reduce-taxes-on-mutual-funds-2466701 
[https://perma.cc/QBH9-RWCV] (explaining that selling mutual funds in a 401(k) plan does not 
generate taxes). 
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cost and performance. Passive fund sponsors that principally compete against 
active fund sponsors therefore have an incentive to take measures to 
neutralize the comparative advantage enjoyed by sponsors of active funds—
that is, their ability to use their investment discretion to generate alpha. To 
the extent that sponsors offer both active and passive funds, they also have an 
incentive to engage in order to improve the performance of their higher-cost 
active fund options. As we explain in the next Section, both factors create an 
incentive for fund sponsors to engage with their portfolio companies. 
Before we move on, we offer a few points of clarification concerning 
collective action problems, cross-sponsor differences, and the dimensions of 
competition among fund sponsors. 
Collective Action. We acknowledge that, at the fund level, passive funds’ 
competition with active funds is characterized by an asymmetric collective 
action problem. An actively managed fund can make itself attractive to 
potential investors by deploying its stock picking skills to attempt to beat the 
benchmark. In contrast, a passive fund’s market-wide efforts are likely to 
benefit all passive funds tracking the same index. This collective action 
problem, however, characterizes all institutional investor engagement in 
corporate governance—by both active and passive funds.93 Costly steps that 
investors may take to improve the performance of companies in their 
portfolio benefit all the investors that hold shares of these companies.94 
Concededly, the collective action problem may limit the extent to which 
passive funds are willing to participate in costly engagement efforts. To an 
extent, the decision is driven by which competitors a given fund fears most—
active funds or other passive funds.95 There are several countervailing 
considerations, however. As we explain in more detail below, the engagement 
activities of passive funds are facilitated by the informational advantages of 
active funds in the same family and inure to the benefit of those funds as well 
as the passive funds.96 Moreover, because of their size, the Big Three enjoy 
substantial economies of scale with respect to corporate governance and 
market-wide initiatives.97 The size of the Big Three enables them to capture 
 
93 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1009, 1023-24 (1994) (arguing that, because its competitors are able to free-ride on an institutional 
investor’s monitoring, monitoring “diminishes the institutional investor’s returns relative to the 
market as a whole”). 
94 See id. 
95 The more resources a passive fund’s sponsor devotes to corporate governance, the better it 
can hedge the fund’s risk of losing assets to actively managed funds. But if the expenditures lead to 
a higher expense ratio, they compromise the fund’s position vis-à-vis other index funds. 
96 See infra notes 130–131 and accompanying text. 
97 See infra notes 112–116 and accompanying text. 
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outsize benefits from improved corporate governance.98 Governance 
engagement also may give fund sponsors another dimension on which to 
compete for assets.99 Finally, and perhaps most important, although this article 
focuses on economic incentives, fund sponsors also act as fiduciaries for the 
shareholders in their funds.100 Sponsors’ fiduciary duties include taking 
reasonable measures to maximize the value of the assets that they invest, and 
they create an additional reason for funds to behave as responsible owners.101 
Cross-Sponsor Differences. The effect of the competition between active and 
passive funds may vary across fund sponsors. On the one hand, those sponsors 
that derive a higher proportion of their income from passive funds may be 
more concerned about the comparative advantage of active funds. On the 
other hand, those sponsors that also have substantial actively managed 
holdings are best able to leverage both the firm-specific expertise and the 
trading opportunities of their active managers. We do not seek here to 
identify how an individual fund sponsor may balance these incentives; it is 
sufficient for our purposes to recognize that both are likely to motivate 
sponsor engagement. 
Other Levels of Competition. Fund sponsors compete on other dimensions. 
For example, as noted above, a substantial proportion of mutual fund assets are 
invested through employer-sponsored retirement plans. Many fund sponsors, 
including primarily passive sponsors such as Vanguard and active sponsors such 
as Fidelity, compete both to administer these plans and to provide the funds 
that will serve as investment options in the plans.102 In this model, index funds 
compete within the fund complex for investment fund flows but also enable the 
sponsor to compete to administer plans by lowering the average fee level of the 
 
98 See Lewellen & Lewellen, supra note 27, at 17 (highlighting the size of BlackRock’s portfolio 
and noting how large total gains follow small percentage shifts in returns). 
99 Active governance may serve a branding or marketing function. BlackRock, for example, 
enjoys substantial public attention from Larry Fink’s letters to the CEOs of its portfolio companies. 
See Fink, supra note 35; see also Arno Riedl & Paul Smeets, Why Do Investors Hold Socially Responsible 
Mutual Funds?, 72 J. FIN. 2505, 2507 (2017) (reporting that some investors seem to be willing to pay 
higher fees and earn lower returns for investing in socially responsible mutual funds);  Symposium, 
Corporate Governance “Counter-Narratives”: On Corporate Purpose and Shareholder Value(s), 31 J. APP. 
CORP. FIN. 9, 21 (2019) (quoting Ronald Gilson’s roundtable comments on legal and political 
challenges to corporate purpose) (predicting that some investors will be willing to pay higher fees 
for environmental, social, and governance (ESG)-conscious funds). 
100 For an exploration of the role of fiduciary duties, see infra Section III.C. 
101 We note that the UK has attempted to formalize the stewardship obligations of institutional 
investors through the adoption of the Stewardship Code. See generally Iris H-Y Chiu, Institutional 
Shareholders as Stewards: Toward a New Conception of Corporate Governance, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. 
& COM. L. 387 (2012). 
102 See Kent Thune, The 7 Best Mutual Funds to Hold in a 401k Plan, INVESTORPLACE (Aug. 
18, 2017, 3:08 PM), https://investorplace.com/2017/08/best-mutual-funds-401k-plan-401k-funds/ 
[https://perma.cc/75W8-8Y6F] (terming Vanguard, Fidelity, and American Funds the “biggest 
players in the employer-sponsored-plan business”). 
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overall plan. At the same time, once an asset manager wins a company’s 401(k) 
plan business, they typically provide a plan that includes both lower-cost 
indexed options and higher cost actively managed funds, and those funds 
compete for investment dollars within the plan.103 
C. Passive Funds and Governance 
Passive funds, by their very nature, must hold both the good and bad 
companies in their index. They do not have the option of exit and thus lack 
the active funds’ ability to generate alpha through investment choices. Passive 
investors also do not have the firm-specific information or expertise necessary 
to address operational issues. Instead, passive investors compete against 
active funds by using their voice and seeking to improve corporate 
governance. 
For example, a passive investor can identify governance “best practices” 
that are likely to reduce the risk of underperformance with little firm-specific 
information, and the investment in identifying a governance improvement 
can be deployed across a broad range of portfolio companies.104 Although we 
note that index funds do not typically submit shareholder proposals,105 by way 
of comparison, the NYC Comptroller, the office charged with administering 
New York City’s pension funds, incurred a minimal marginal cost in 
submitting a proxy access shareholder proposal to 75 portfolio companies in 
its pension fund.106 
Unlike active funds, passive investors cannot take advantage of issuer mis-
pricing, but they can try to reduce it in a variety of ways. They may do so 
directly by supporting governance initiatives like higher-quality financial 
reporting, as well as indirectly by seeking enhanced board monitoring or 
better-functioning audit committees with financial expertise. Good 
governance can also reduce price volatility. A firm with greater governance 
 
103 See, e.g., Clemens Sialm, Laura T. Starks & Hanjiang Zhang, Defined Contribution Pension 
Plans: Sticky or Discerning Money?, 70 J. FIN. 805, 805 (2015) (finding that “flows into funds from 
[defined contribution or “DC”] assets are more volatile and exhibit more performance sensitivity 
than non-DC flows, primarily due to adjustments to the investment options by the plan sponsors.”). 
104 A passive investor can also target a generic governance reform to those companies that it 
identifies as underperformers. CalPERS, one of the first governance activists, employed this 
strategy in the early years of its engagement. See, e.g., Stephen L. Nesbitt, Long-term Rewards from 
Shareholder Activism: A Study of the “CalPERS Effect,” 6 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 75, 76 (1994). 
105 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 8 (manuscript at 48) (“Our review of these almost-
4,000 shareholder proposals [submitted from 2008 to 2017] did not identify a single proposal 
submitted by any of the Big Three.”). 
106 See Nikita Stewart, City Comptroller Reaches Deals with 5 Companies on Giving Shareholders 
Say on Directors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/nyregion/city-
comptroller-reaches-deals-with-5-companies-on-giving-shareholders-say-on-directors.html 
[https://perma.cc/AHL5-8XDX]. 
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risk may experience more frequent price movements due to the 
materialization of those risks, and its price movements in response to firm or 
market-wide developments may be more extreme as the developments 
generate greater investor uncertainty about the impact of those developments 
on the firm.107 High quality corporate governance is also likely to reduce the 
frequency of value-decreasing events such as insider self-dealing, fraud, 
overconfidence bias, director groupthink, and so forth.108 In addition, firm-
specific problems may have spillover effects on the other companies in a 
passive fund’s portfolio.109 Generic governance improvements that increase 
board oversight and managerial accountability, such as annual election of 
directors and proxy access, thus offer the potential for reducing 
underperformance. The competition with active funds thus provides passive 
investors with incentives to invest in governance and other market-wide 
changes that limit the competitive advantage of active funds. 
Moreover, because of their size, passive investors in general, and the Big 
Three in particular, have a comparative advantage in using voting and 
engagement to address issues such as corporate governance. This advantage 
is twofold. First, passive investors enjoy economies of scale that significantly 
reduce the effective costs of engagement on a per-company basis. Their large 
holdings also mean that passive investors gain more—in dollar terms—from 
governance and other changes that enhance the value of portfolio companies. 
As a result, despite facing the competitive pressure of fee competition, 
engagement remains rational.110 Second, their holdings increasingly allow 
passive funds to be the pivotal voter, increasing their ability to implement 
changes or to pressure issuers to do so voluntarily. 
With respect to the first point, the low-fee model of passive investment has 
made passive funds highly attractive to customers and has led to dramatic 
growth in the quantity of assets managed by passive fund sponsors. Economies 
 
107 See Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson & Darius Palia, The Core Corporate Governance Puzzle: 
Contextualizing the Link to Performance, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1995, 2004 (2019) (stating that good 
governance “can be a signal concerning a firm’s managerial quality, a characteristic that is difficult 
for the market to observe directly”). 
108 See René Otto & Wim Weterings, D&O Insurance and Corporate Governance: Is D&O 
Insurance Indicative of the Quality of Corporate Governance in a Company?, 24 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 
105, 111 (2019) (explaining the value of corporate governance in limiting managerial agency costs and 
reducing the risk of opportunistic behavior). 
109 See, e.g., Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 5), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3378783 [https://perma.cc/3YHL-
DLEA] (“If a subset of firms in a portfolio impose costs on the broader portfolio through the 
generation of negative externalities, a portfolio-wide owner should be motivated to curtail those 
externalities at the source.”). 
110 See Lewellen & Lewellen, supra note 27, at 17 (observing that “the largest institutional 
investors—because of their size—actually have stronger incentives to be engaged tha[n] many activist 
investors”) (emphasis in original). 
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of scale enable large sponsors to charge lower fees, making their funds relatively 
more attractive.111 The Big Three manage three quarters of all passively 
managed funds.112 Because of their size, these large fund sponsors own 
substantial stakes in their portfolio companies and are less likely than active 
ones to suffer from the collective action problems of smaller shareholders.113 
Even though the overall expense ratios at the passive funds are low, because of 
their large size, they nonetheless generate substantial fees for their sponsors, 
enabling them to devote substantial resources to governance.114 
Moreover, these resources are spread across a broad portfolio and, in the 
case of market-wide initiatives, the cost of engagement on a per issuer basis is 
likely to be low, especially if a fund sponsor supports a particular governance 
reform across its entire portfolio. Governance provisions such as proxy access, 
forum-selection bylaws, or staggered boards are likely to be in play at multiple 
companies within the passive fund’s portfolio. Passive investors are well-placed 
to evaluate such provisions and to determine whether these provisions are 
likely, as a general matter, to increase or decrease firm value at the majority of 
portfolio companies.115 They are also more likely to internalize any spillover 
effects that may arise from governance provisions.116 
Second, the fact that passive investors are likely to be pivotal voters 
facilitates their engagement with portfolio companies. Management has clear 
 
111 See, e.g., Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fee Litigation: Some Analytical Clarity, 16 
J. BUS. & SEC. L. 329, 351 (2016) (“Economies of scale exist and are substantial in the portfolio 
management process.”). 
112 See Reshma Kapadia, Passive Investors Are the New Shareholder Activists, BARRON’S (July 8, 
2017, 1:27 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/passive-investors-are-the-new-shareholder-
activists-1499491673 [https://perma.cc/AU5Q-HW44]. Notably, the next three firms, in terms of 
size, Fidelity, JP Morgan and BNY Mellon, rely more heavily on active management. 
113 Cf. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional 
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2110-12 (1995) 
(explaining, analogously, that institutional investors’ large stakes make it rational for them to 
participate actively in shareholder litigation). 
114 See Lewellen & Lewellen, supra note 27, at 4. 
115 See also Rock & Kahan, supra note 8, at 34-35 (stating that governance arrangements tend 
to be “issue-specific” rather than “firm-specific”). 
116 Some governance changes at one company may also benefit its peers. See, e.g., Michael D. 
Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 123, 136 (2004) (describing positive externalities associated with mandated securities 
disclosure). There is evidence that cross-ownership by large investors leads to more disclosure by 
portfolio companies. See, e.g., Jie (Jack) He, Jiekun Huang & Shan Zhao, Internalizing Governance 
Externalities: The Role of Institutional Cross-Ownership, 134 J. FIN. ECON. 400, 414 (2019) (citing 
empirical evidence supporting the premise that “institutional cross-owners play an active role in 
internalizing governance externalities”); Andrea Pawliczek, A. Nicole Skinner & Sarah L.C. 
Zechman, Facilitating Tacit Collusion: A New Perspective on Common Ownership and Voluntary 
Disclosure 27 (May 8, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3002075 (finding evidence that common ownership is associated with 
an increased disclosure and observing spillover effects from common owners to other investors). 
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incentives to engage with shareholders whose support can be outcome 
determinative in a shareholder vote. At the same time, the increasing 
importance of shareholder voting rights enables passive investors to exercise 
influence not only directly through voting, but also indirectly through the 
threat of casting a substantial number of votes in opposition to a management 
position or policy (even if the vote is not legally binding).117 The Dodd-Frank 
Act, for example, implements a requirement that issuers allow shareholders 
the opportunity to vote on executive compensation.118 Shareholder proposals 
have broadened in scope, putting a wide range of topics before the 
shareholders.119 Modifications to the process of electing directors, such as 
proxy access and majority voting, have made shareholder votes on director 
elections more significant.120 And changes to Delaware corporate law have 
increased the legal significance of shareholder voting with respect to a range 
of issues, including approval of mergers and the structure of director 
compensation plans.121 Voting on all these issues gives passive investors a 
powerful tool to pressure issuers for change and enables institutional 
investors to signal their dissatisfaction with specific issuer policies and, more 
generally, with the issuer’s economic performance.122 
 
117 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail Investor, 
102 MINN. L. REV. 11, 14 (2017) (observing that “[r]ecent regulatory changes and the rise of 
shareholder activism have made shareholder voting power increasingly important”). 
118 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78n-1 (2018). 
119 See, e.g., Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 327 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(evaluating Wal-Mart’s obligation to include a shareholder proposal seeking to compel it to develop 
standards regarding the sale of firearms); Deere & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 5862424 
(Dec. 3, 2015) (declining to concur with Deere’s view that it could exclude a shareholder proposal 
requesting an annual report to the shareholders on the corporation’s political activity); Exxon 
Shareholders Approve Measure on Climate-Change Report, CNBC (May 31, 2017, 4:37 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/31/exxon-steps-up-efforts-to-sway-shareholders-on-climate-report-
vote.html [https://perma.cc/LC8T-3RK5] (reporting on shareholder proposal requesting that the 
company report on “the impact on its business of compliance with global climate change 
guidelines . . . .”). 
120 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Does Majority 
Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1124-26 (2016) (describing the shift in 
public companies from plurality to majority voting). 
121 See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings, LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 306 (Del. 2015) (applying 
business judgment rule to board’s decision to approve a merger when approved by fully informed 
shareholder vote); Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Bosnjak, C.A. No. 9178-CB, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 107, at 
*27-28 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2014) (applying the waste standard of review to dismiss challenges to 
outside directors’ equity awards when awards had been approved by shareholder vote). 
122 See, e.g., Jill Fisch, Darius Palia & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Is Say on Pay All About Pay? 
The Impact of Firm Performance, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101, 101 (2018) (documenting 
responsiveness of say-on-pay voting to both characteristics of compensation plans and issuers’ 
overall economic performance). 
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Critically, passive investors’ voting power allows them to engage at lower 
cost. Passive investors need not resort to costly and confrontational tactics 
such as litigation and shareholder proposals. Their ability to influence 
management through their voting power increases the likelihood that 
management will both meet with them and respond to their concerns. This 
influence may explain the observation by some commentators that passive 
investors are less likely to vote against management.123 Because of their 
leverage, such votes are often unnecessary.124 Studies show that issuers are 
responsive to the interests of large investors and will frequently modify their 
policies rather than put issues to a vote that they expect to lose.125 As a result, 
it may be unnecessary for passive investors to vote against an executive 
compensation plan or in favor of a shareholder proposal.126 
A fund’s status as a pivotal investor not only increases its voting leverage 
but also reduces the cost of monitoring. Corporate managers appreciate the 
importance of cultivating the votes of passive investors and are more likely to 
communicate and share information with them.127 Similarly, because the 
support of passive investors is necessary for activist campaigns to be 
successful, activists are likely to approach passive investors voluntarily in 
order to share their ideas and enlist their support.128 A well-documented 
 
123 See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate 
Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1151, 1180 (2019) (observing that large mutual fund sponsors “are less likely 
than other investors and third-party proxy advisors to support the dissident slate in a proxy 
contest”); Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li & James Pinnington, Picking Friends Before Picking (Proxy) 
Fights: How Mutual Fund Voting Shapes Proxy Contests 3 (ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, 
Paper No. 601, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3101473 (finding that passive funds are less likely 
than active funds to vote against management in proxy fights). 
124 See, e.g., Kapadia, supra note 112 (explaining that, for passive investors, “a proxy vote isn’t a 
good gauge of their activism, but rather, a last resort”). 
125 See, e.g., Rob Bauer, Frank Moers & Michael Viehs, Who Withdraws Shareholder Proposals 
and Does it Matter? An Analysis of Sponsor Identity and Pay Practices, 23 CORP. GOVERNANCE 472, 484 
(2015) (documenting that managers proactively settle with large shareholders by changing corporate 
practices rather than putting proposals to a vote and losing). 
126 This observation explains empirical findings about the limited extent to which passive 
investors vote in opposition to management on shareholder proposals such as say on pay. See, e.g., 
Griffith & Lund, supra note 123, at 1180. 
127 See David R. Beatty, How Activist Investors Are Transforming the Role of Public-company 
Boards, MCKINSEY & CO. (Jan. 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-
corporate-finance/our-insights/how-activist-investors-are-transforming-the-role-of-public-
company-boards [https://perma.cc/4CVD-GQQ3] (“[B]oards and executives frequently review lists 
of the largest shareholders in order of percentage of holdings. They then decide on a consultation 
strategy that may well include a visit from an independent director without any management being 
present.”). 
128 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 900 (2013) (“After [an 
initial investment], the activist undertakes a nonpublic campaign to elicit a favorable institutional 
response.”). 
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highway of information runs between activist shareholders and the Big Three 
as each trades information about underperforming firms.129 
By serving as gatekeepers for activism, passive funds also play a 
complementary role in the more focused engagement provided by hedge 
funds. As Ron Gilson and Jeff Gordon have observed, hedge funds typically 
purchase less than 10% of an issuer’s shares and, as a result, cannot wage a 
successful campaign unless they have the support of institutional investors 
(and thus passive funds).130 As pivotal voters, passive investors can mediate 
activist efforts by evaluating the hedge fund’s strategy and providing support 
only if they believe it is likely to be successful. Notably, conducting a firm-
specific analysis in such cases is not cost-prohibitive because a limited number 
of a passive investor’s portfolio companies are involved in mergers, activist 
campaigns, and the like. Unlike sponsors of actively managed funds, sponsors 
with substantial passive holdings may exercise their voting power with a 
longer-term focus because—unlike predominantly active fund sponsors—
they are less able to overweight and then exit a target for which the activist’s 
agenda is focused on the creation of short-term gains.131 
Finally, passive fund sponsors are aided in all these efforts by the fact that 
their product mixture typically includes active and passive funds. This 
mixture, which most commentators have ignored, creates efficient cross-
subsidization due to the differing expertise of active and passive funds. Active 
funds that need to evaluate a governance proposal, for example, can benefit 
from the governance expertise of passive funds, expertise that might be too 
costly for active funds to develop. Passive funds benefit from the firm-specific 
information generated by active investors in connection with stock-picking 
information that is particularly useful in the context of economically 
significant shareholder votes such as proxy contests and mergers. As we detail 
below,132 it is common for fund sponsors to coordinate the engagement and 
voting activities of their active and passive funds through a centralized 
governance or stewardship committee, a measure designed, at many fund 
families, to increase information flow between active and passive funds. This 
 
129 See Beatty, supra note 127 (“Collaboration between activists and traditional asset managers 
is changing the boardroom.”). 
130 Gilson & Gordon, supra note 128, at 897 (“While activist investors frame and seek to force 
governance/performance changes, they are successful only if they can attract broad support from 
institutional investors capable of assessing alternative strategies presented to them . . . .”). 
131 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to 
the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 478 (2014) (“Precisely 
because index funds do not sell stocks in their target index, those funds have a unique interest in 
corporations pursuing fundamentally sound strategies that will generate the most durable wealth for 
stockholders.”). 
132 See infra notes 143–149 and accompanying text. 
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enables the efforts of passive and active funds within the same fund family to 
be complementary. 
Our analysis does not suggest that passive investors will seek to identify 
and address firm-specific operational deficiencies.133 We agree with other 
commentators that passive investors lack the expertise and the resources to 
do so effectively.134 This feature, however, is not unique to passive investors 
but is common to active mutual funds (as well as public pension funds and 
retail investors).135 Governance engagement and engagement on issues that 
are common to a number of portfolio companies such as board composition, 
cybersecurity, and risk management, do not require a fund to generate an 
improved business strategy for a specific company in its portfolio. At the same 
time, these efforts can increase performance for all companies in a passive 
fund’s portfolio, thereby improving market-wide returns and discouraging 
capital flight to active funds or alternatively composed competing indexes. 
II. THE PASSIVE INVESTOR IN PRACTICE 
The preceding Part set out our theory of passive investors. In this Part we 
demonstrate that the behavior of passive investors is consistent with our theory. 
Section A examines how governance works in the mutual fund complex. 
Section B explores the relationship between passive funds and activists. Section 
C examines how passive funds affect governance through voice. 
A. Passive Investors and Governance 
Contemporaneous with the growth of passive investors has been their 
increasing involvement in corporate governance. Institutional investor 
participation in corporate governance began with the engagement of several 
 
133 We readily acknowledge that passive funds lack the research necessary to engage based on 
fundamentals analysis. See, e.g., SHARON E. FAY, ALLIANCEBERNSTEIN, THE MEGAPHONE 
EFFECT: AMPLIFYING THE IMPACT OF ENGAGEMENT WITH MANAGEMENT 3 (2018), 
https://www.alliancebernstein.com/sites/library/Instrumentation/FINAL_EQU-7697-0618.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/56SM-7S66] (observing that “index funds are noticeably absent from engagement 
based on fundamental research”). 
134 We also disagree with Bebchuk and Hirst to the extent that they criticize passive investors 
for failing to engage in the level of monitoring that might be expected by a single owner. Apart from 
the fact that, for the reasons we identify, a single owner is an inappropriate benchmark, the costs of 
such engagement would dramatically change the business model of passive investors and reduce 
their attractiveness as an investment vehicle for their customers. 
135 See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 93, at 1024 (identifying why free-riding rationally reduces the 
expenditures by institutional investors in firm-specific monitoring); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 
128, at 889 (“Public funds are more likely to be proactive but largely limited to governance matters 
rather than firm strategy or implementation. At most, institutions might engage in ‘governance 
activism,’ not ‘performance activism.’”). 
 
44 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 17 
large public pension funds—most visibly CalPERS.136 Mutual funds, both 
passive and active, did not join in the initial efforts, and commentators offered 
a variety of reasons why mutual funds lacked the incentives to participate in 
efforts to improve the corporate governance of their portfolio companies.137 
The situation changed in the aftermath of the SEC’s 2003 adoption of a 
rule requiring mutual funds to disclose how they vote their portfolio 
company shares.138 Although the rule technically does not require mutual 
funds to vote on every issue that is submitted to the shareholders, as a 
practical matter, mutual funds have responded to it by voting virtually all 
of their shares.139 For example, BlackRock states that it aims to vote 100% 
of its shares in 17,000 firms across 85 markets.140 These votes and any 
policies underlying the voting are filed publicly with the SEC and tracked 
by others in the market, allowing mutual funds not only to express their 
voice at the firm level but to the entire market.141 
Mutual fund sponsors structure their voting operations in different 
ways.142 Many large fund sponsors centralize voting decisions through the use 
of a voting or governance staff that makes voting decisions on behalf of the 
 
136 See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing 
Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 315-16 (2008) (describing 
CalPERS’s leadership role in affecting the corporate governance of portfolio companies and the 
empirical research studying CalPERS’s effectiveness in leveraging this strategy). 
137 See, e.g., James Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and Mutual 
Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (2010) (describing and offering reasons for 
traditional mutual fund passivity, including the possibility that the costs would outweigh the 
benefits, possible conflicts of interest, and legal and regulatory restrictions). 
138 See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered 
Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Feb. 7, 2003). 
139 See, e.g., PROXYPULSE, 2017 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 2 (2017), https://broadridge.com/_
assets/pdf/broadridge-2017-proxy-season-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/CH3E-7SVX] (reporting 
that institutional investors voted 91% of their shares in the 2017 proxy season). 
140 BLACKROCK, PROXY VOTING AND SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT FAQ 1-2 (2019), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-faq-
global.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UGW-J8MP] [hereinafter BLACKROCK, FAQ] (“We aim to vote at 
100% of meetings where our clients have given us authority to vote their shares—thus we vote at 
approximately 17,000 shareholder meetings in over 85 markets each year.”). 
141 See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered 
Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. at 6567 (“The Commission is adopting, with 
modifications, amendments that will require each fund to file with the Commission its proxy voting 
record and make this record available to its shareholders.”). See generally K.J. Martijn Cremers & 
Roberta Romano, Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting on Compensation Plans: The Impact of the 2003 
Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Rule, 13 AM. L. ECON. REV. 220 (2011). 
142 See Bonnie Saynay & Henning Stein, INVESCO WHITE PAPER SERIES: PROXY VOTING: 
THE HALLMARK OF ACTIVE OWNERSHIP 6 (2017), https://apinstitutional.invesco.com/ap-
public/dam/jcr:c15b0254-7307-4602-acb4-b8543bd21470/Macro_20170718_ESG%20Proxy%20
Voting-the%20hallmark%20of%20active%20ownership-July2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/6STP-ZRD
6] (describing the varying voting strategies of mutual fund sponsors); see also Griffith & Lund, supra 
note 123, at 1170-1171 (describing voting practices at the largest passive investors). 
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entire fund complex.143 At some sponsors, voting takes place through a 
centralized governance committee. For example, each Vanguard mutual fund 
delegates voting authority to its Investment Stewardship Oversight 
Committee,144 although Vanguard recently announced that, as of the end of 
2019, the portfolio managers of its actively managed funds will be responsible 
for casting votes on certain issues affecting the shares that they manage.145 
Alternatively, individual fund managers may retain voting authority. In 
such cases, however, fund sponsors still provide mechanisms for their 
managers to share information and coordinate their voting decisions. For 
example, BlackRock has a centralized voting function, but individual fund 
managers retain ultimate voting authority to depart from the “BlackRock” 
view.146 T. Rowe Price has a proxy committee that recommends how funds 
vote and, although the ultimate voting discretion remains with the fund 
manager, a fund manager must document his or her reasons for deviating 
from the central recommendation.147 Invesco uses an innovative voting 
 
143 See, e.g., Strine, supra note 131, at 478 n.85 (citing sources documenting centralization of 
voting authority at BlackRock, Fidelity, and Vanguard). But see Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel 
Kahan, Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 35, 
47-48 (2013) (reporting varying degrees of centralization among mutual fund families). 
144 The committee is “composed of senior officers at Vanguard without external client duties.” 
VANGUARD, PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES FOR U.S. PORTFOLIO COMPANIES 2 (2019), 
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/portfolio-company-
resources/proxy_voting_guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WR2-L28M] [hereinafter VANGUARD, 
PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES]; see also, e.g., Hortense Bioy, Jose Garcia-Zarate & Alex Bryan, Passive 
Fund Providers and Investment Stewardship, HARV. LAW SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/12/21/passive-fund-providers-and-investment-
stewardship/ [https://perma.cc/Q7LD-YKXR] (observing that at “Vanguard, SSgA, and LGIM . . . the 
corporate-governance teams have ultimate authority on the final votes”). 
145 Dawn Lim & Cara Lombardo, Vanguard Is Handing Over Some of its Voting Power, WALL ST. 
J. (Apr. 25, 2019, 7:02 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/vanguard-is-handing-over-some-of-its-
voting-power-11556190120 [https://perma.cc/T88A-QCEY] (“By the end of the year . . . firms that 
manage Vanguard’s active equity funds [which represent approximately 9% of Vanguard’s assets 
under management] will be able to cast votes on takeovers, board slates or shareholder proposals 
affecting the portion of shares they oversee[,]” but Vanguard “will continue to vote on its vast index 
fund holdings . . . .”). 
146 See BLACKROCK, FAQ, supra note 140, at 1 (outlining how BlackRock votes shares through 
its Investor Stewardship team). 
147 See T. ROWE PRICE, PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 1 (2019), https://www3.
troweprice.com/usis/content/trowecorp/en/utility/policies/_jcr_content/maincontent/polices_row_1
/para-mid/thiscontent/pdf_link/pdffile [https://perma.cc/88X8-E9FH] (stating that proxy vote 
recommendations are made by the Proxy Committee but that fund managers ultimately have the 
discretion to vote for their companies, as long as they “document their reasons in writing to the 
Proxy Committee”). The centralized recommendations of T. Rowe Price’s proxy committee are 
limited, however, and leave a substantial number of issues including say on pay, separating the chair 
and CEO positions, and ESG issues to a case-by-case determination in which the portfolio managers 
play a substantial role in making company-specific determinations and may ultimately decide to vote 
their shares differently. See Donna F. Anderson, T. Rowe Price’s Investment Philosophy on Shareholder 
Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 18, 2018), 
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platform that allows its individual fund managers to debate upcoming votes 
at their portfolio companies and to reach consensus.148 Even funds that 
generally centralize voting decisions may give voting authority to fund 
managers for particular issues such as mergers or election contests where 
firm-specific information is important.149 Finally, a fund may outsource its 
voting decisions.150 A number of small fund complexes appear to delegate 
voting decisions to a proxy advisor such as Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS).151 
Centralized governance committees, voting platforms, and consultation 
among fund managers are among the tools that allow sponsors to leverage 
their resources across all funds to make voting decisions. Active funds benefit 
from the governance expertise of passive funds, and passive funds, in turn, 
rely on the company-specific knowledge of active managers.152 Notably, fund 
voting involves ongoing interaction between the governance groups and 
between passive and active fund managers.153 The result of these mechanisms 
is a high degree of commonality among fund voting decisions, even when the 
complex gives portfolio managers the discretion to make voting decisions for 
their funds.154 
On the other hand, particularly with respect to specific transactions such 
as proxy contests and mergers, members of a fund family do not appear to 
vote in lockstep.155 Moreover, each individual fund sponsor has its own 
policies and practices, which determine the way that fund complex votes and 
 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/18/t-rowe-prices-investment-philosophy-on-shareholder-
activism/ [https://perma.cc/RR8Q-LWT2]. 
148 Saynay & Stein, supra note 142, at 8 (“[T]he Invesco Fund Manager Portal . . . allows for 
proxy voting to be based on consensus intelligence instead of one person or team overruling 
everybody else[. It enables] managers who might have deeper insights and more up-to-date 
information to share their knowledge among colleagues.”). 
149 See, e.g., VANGUARD, PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES, supra note 144, at 9. 
150 For example, Fidelity outsources the voting by its index funds to subadvisor Geode. See 
Bioy et al., supra note 144, at 4. 
151 See Choi et al., Who Calls the Shots?, supra note 143 at 53 (reporting that mutual fund voting 
that is most closely aligned with ISS recommendations accounts for a relatively small proportion of 
mutual fund assets). 
152 Some mutual fund companies explicitly rely on their active managers to determine the 
voting policies of their passive funds. See, e.g., Saynay & Stein, supra note 142, at 7 (explaining that 
Invesco’s passive funds engage in echo-voting to “leverage active equity expertise”). 
153 See, e.g., id. at 8 (explaining how Invesco’s proxy voting platform “encourages an internal 
debate on any vote, enabling managers who might have deeper insights and more up-to-date 
information to share their knowledge among colleagues”). 
154 See, e.g., Choi et al., Who Calls the Shots?, supra note 143 (documenting the degree of 
centralization in voting decisions within fund families). 
155 See Bioy et al., supra note 144, at exhibit 3 (detailing differences across fund complexes in voting 
policies and practices). The failure of fund sponsors even to coordinate their voting behavior offers 
reasons to question academic papers suggesting that common ownership among large passive investors 
raises antitrust concerns. See, e.g., Morton & Hovenkamp, supra note 7; Posner et al., supra note 7. 
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the frequency with which it votes against management.156 Empirical evidence 
indicates that funds that have a greater percentage of an issuer’s equity are 
more likely to engage in active voting,157 more likely to devote resources to 
making voting decisions and less likely to follow the recommendations of 
ISS.158 Critically, this suggests that, for the votes in which passive investors 
are most influential, they are most likely to be informed.159 
A variety of sources have documented the effect of mutual fund voting on 
corporate governance and operational decisions.160 Most do not distinguish 
between active and passive investors. However, Appel, Gormley, and Keim’s 
recent empirical study focuses specifically on the effect of passive ownership 
by using a discontinuity analysis based on stock assignments in the Russell 
1000 and 2000 indexes.161 They examine three types of governance measures 
and conclude that passive ownership influences the governance of the firm. 
Specifically, they find that increased passive ownership is associated with an 
increased number of independent directors, decreased takeover defenses, and 
an increase in one-share, one-vote ownership rights.162 
 
156 See Bioy, et al., supra note 144, at exhibit 3. 
157 See Peter Iliev & Michelle Lowry, Are Mutual Funds Active Voters?, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 446, 
458-60 (2015). 
158 See id. at 455 (suggesting that larger fund families are less likely to follow ISS voting 
recommendations); see also Choi, et al., Who Calls the Shots?, supra note 143, at 53-54, 61-62 (2013) 
(reporting that large fund families are less likely to follow ISS recommendations and identifying 
divergence between Vanguard’s votes and ISS recommendations). 
159 This contrasts with Professor Lund’s claim that passive investors adhere to a “a low-cost, 
unthinking approach to governance . . . .” See Lund, supra note 7, at 513. 
160 See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, How 
Corporate Governance is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 678-94 (2016) 
(studying mutual fund voting and engagement and its effect on golden leash compensation 
arrangements); Steven Mufson, Financial Firms Lead Shareholder Rebellion Against ExxonMobil 
Climate Change Policies, WASH. POST (May 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/05/31/exxonmobil-is-trying-to-fend-off-a-shareholder-reb
ellion-over-climate-change/?utm_term=.9579fd3049f6 [https://perma.cc/LGN5-8MRY] (reporting 
that BlackRock and Vanguard owned 13% of ExxonMobil and that their votes were pivotal in the 
passage of a shareholder proposal seeking improved disclosure about the effects of climate change). 
161 See Appel et al., Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, supra note 38. Appel, Gormley, and 
Keim’s use of the Russell 2000/1000 as an identification method has been ubiquitous and has now 
been used in at least six different studies. See Ian Appel, Todd A. Gormley & Donald B. Keim, 
Identification Using Russell 1000/2000 Index Assignments: A Discussion of Methodologies 1 (May 
20, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2641548. It is unclear to us whether 
this IV is a correct one or is merely picking up changes in companies that are destined to either 
enter or exit the index as index recalibration is predictable from year to year and is reflected in firm 
performance. Nonetheless, they do give some preliminary evidence of passive investor influence. 
This empirical evidence is buttressed by extensive anecdotal evidence. 
162 In addition, Appel, Gormley, and Keim find that passive ownership is associated not just 
with observed governance differences, but also with improved performance as measured by return 
on assets and Tobin’s Q. See Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, supra note 38, at 114. 
But see Appel, Gormley & Keim, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: The Effect of Passive Investors on 
Activism, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 2720, 2753 (finding that “passive ownership does not have a statistically 
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However, passive investor voting does not operate in a vacuum. Instead, 
passive investors increasingly use their voting power as leverage to gain an 
audience with managers and directors at their portfolio companies to 
communicate their views and encourage changes.163 Passive funds have shown 
increased willingness to vote against management, an approach that increases 
the effectiveness of their private engagements.164 Evidence shows that this 
willingness coupled with the leverage provided by their substantial ownership 
is often sufficient to produce a management response.165 
In recent years, private engagement by mutual funds has grown 
dramatically.166 Mutual funds have increasingly made direct contact—by 
letter, phone, electronic communication, and direct meetings—with the 
officers and directors of their portfolio companies.167 One recent survey 
reports that 63% of large institutional investors engaged in direct discussions 
with management over the past five years and 45% had private discussions 
with a company’s board outside of management presence.168 Similarly, the 
 
significant association with target firms’ cash holdings, dividend yield, leverage ratio, level of capital 
expenditures or research and development (R&D) expenses, return on assets, Tobin’s q, or stock 
return in the year prior to being targeted”). 
163 Passive funds can also exert market pressure through the composition of their indexes. For 
example, Fidelity offers two sustainability index funds, and a shift by investors of substantial assets 
into these funds would create an incentive for issuers to adopt more sustainable business practices. 
Fidelity Launches First Two Sustainability-Focused Index Funds, FIDELITY (May 15, 2017), 
https://www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/institutional-investment-management/first-two-
sustainability-focused-index-funds [https://perma.cc/B5WV-QTQ6]. 
164 See, e.g., Kapadia, supra note 112 (explaining that “there appears to be an increasing 
willingness to act when talks don’t progress”). 
165 Id. 
166 This engagement takes various forms. See, e.g., STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, PROXY 
VOTING AND ENGAGEMENT GUIDELINES 2 (2019), https://www.ssga.com/our-insights/
viewpoints/2019-proxy-voting-and-engagement-guidelines-north-america.html [https://perma.cc/
KK94-CWQD] (reporting that SSGA engages “with companies to provide insight on the principles 
and practices that drive our voting decisions. We also conduct proactive engagements to address 
significant shareholder concerns and environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) issues in a 
manner consistent with maximizing shareholder value”); Sarah Krouse, At BlackRock, Vanguard and 
State Street, ‘Engagement’ Has Different Meanings, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/at-blackrock-vanguard-and-state-street-engagement-has-different-
meanings-1516449600 [https://perma.cc/38A8-AZ4P] (noting that engagement takes different 
routes for different passive investors). 
167 Engagement is, of course, not limited to passive investors, but is also done by actively 
managed mutual funds and hedge funds. See, e.g., Matthew J. Mallow & Jasmin Sethi, Engagement: 
The Missing Middle Approach in the Bebchuk-Strine Debate, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 385, 395 (2016) 
(reporting that T. Rowe Price “holds hundreds of short, direct conversations with companies owned 
in portfolios it manages throughout the year on issues that fall beyond the normal due diligence 
meetings with the companies”). 
168 Joseph A. McCahery, Zacharias Sautner & Laura T. Starks, Behind the Scenes: The Corporate 
Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905, 2906 (2016). 
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percentage of S&P 500 companies reporting investor engagement rose from 
56% in 2015 to 77% as of July 2018.169 
The engagement of the large passive investors in particular has increased. 
During 2017, BlackRock had over 1600 engagements with its portfolio 
companies, Vanguard participated in more than 900 engagements, and State 
Street participated in more than 600.170 In addition to in-person 
engagements, State Street reported sending hundreds of letters to its 
portfolio companies.171 BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street all have 
dedicated corporate governance teams that are responsible for engagement 
with their portfolio companies.172 BlackRock explains, for example, that its 
governance specialists engage “in thousands of conversations with companies 
each year” that build on the new amount and access to information that 
investors have gained in recent years “to glean investment insights.”173 
Vanguard explained that, for the twelve months prior to June 30, 2018, its 
engagements represented greater than $1.6 trillion in fund assets and reflected 
an increase in engagement volume of 63% from 2014.174 
As with voting, the mixture of passive and active funds within the same 
fund complex creates complementarity with respect to engagement.175 Active 
funds can identify underperforming issuers that might be an appropriate target 
for governance or other improvements, but the sponsor can then leverage the 
voting power from its passive funds to maximize its impact. Together, active 
and passive funds finance the sponsor’s knowledge and expertise even if they 
benefit in different ways from the deployment of that expertise. 
 
169 2018 Proxy Season Review, ERNST & YOUNG (July 2018), https://www.ey.com/
Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-cbm-proxy-season-review-2018/$FILE/EY-cbm-proxy-season-review-
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/VE7W-MGS8]. 
170 See Krouse, supra note 166. 
171 See id. 
172 See, e.g., Madison Marriage, BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street Bulk Up Governance Staff, FIN. 
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/657b243c-e492-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a 
[https://perma.cc/CZU-Z8WD] (observing that, as of January 2017, BlackRock had increased the size 
of its governance staff to 31 persons, Vanguard had 20 governance employees, and State Street had 11). 
173 BLACKROCK, EXPLORING ESG: A PRACTITIONER’S PERSPECTIVE 2, 1 (2016), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-exploring-esg-a- 
practitioners-perspective-june-2016.pdf [https;//perma.cc/55KU-RJE4]. 
174 VANGUARD, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP 2018 ANNUAL REPORT at 7, 8 (2018), 
https://global.vanguard.com/documents/investment-stewardship-annual-report-v2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P4LD-6MWD]. 
175 See, e.g., Ann M. Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, 44 J. CORP. L. 297, 309 (2019) 
(“[T]hough large asset managers hold their shares across multiple funds, they often coordinate their 
governance and engagement policies so that the funds speak with a single voice, amplifying their 
power.”). 
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Despite these activities, some commentators have criticized passive 
investors for the limited size of their governance staffs.176 We have three 
responses. First, as their level of engagement increases, passive investors are 
increasing the size of the governance staffs.177 Second, the number of 
personnel required to analyze governance issues is significantly smaller than 
that required for conducting research focused on firm-specific characteristics. 
Finally, this criticism ignores the shareholder ecosystem today where 
individual fund complexes interact and rely upon not only proxy advisory 
firms but also shareholder activist hedge funds to supplement their voice, 
monitoring, and information gathering processes. These mechanisms 
substantially lower informational gathering and assessment costs for both 
passive and active funds. 
Relatedly, issuers and shareholders are also developing private initiatives to 
promote board-shareholder engagement. Again, passive investors are at the 
forefront of these efforts. For example, in 2014, major U.S. issuers collaborated 
with several big institutional investors, including BlackRock and Vanguard, to 
create the “Shareholder-Director Exchange Program.”178 Similarly, in 2016, 
representatives of major U.S. corporations and major investors, including again 
BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard, signed an accord supporting a set of 
commonsense principles of corporate governance and calling for an ongoing 
constructive dialogue among issuers and shareholders.179 The “Investor 
Stewardship Group” (ISG) a collective of sixteen large asset managers 
including Vanguard and BlackRock, was formed “to establish a framework for 
standards of stewardship and corporate governance.”180 
Passive investors also engage beyond the level of the individual firm. One 
way in which they do so is by influencing the voting policies of proxy advisory 
firms such as ISS and Glass Lewis. These advisory firms reduce information 
costs with respect to governance, which is critical for cost-conscious passive 
investors with large portfolios. Advisory firms also have a major influence on 
 
176 See, e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst., supra note 7, at 100 (asserting that index funds devote 
“practically negligent resources” to governance and stewardship); Lund, supra note 7, at 515-16 
(arguing that the governance groups at the Big Three are “understaffed” and “not yet up to the 
task”). 
177 See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text. 
178 See James Woolery, Introduction to the SDX Protocol, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 5, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/02/05/introduction-
to-the-sdx-protocol/ [https://perma.cc/K25P-K989]; see also About SDX, SDX, http://www.sdxpr
otocol.com/about-sdx/ [https://perma.cc/VQ3B-3MLH] (last visited Oct. 14, 2017). 
179 See Open Letter from Tim Armour et al., Commonsense Principles 2.0 (Oct. 18, 2018), 
https://www.governanceprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/CSP-2.0-Open-Letter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M4QK-MCPT]. 
180 David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Common-Sense Capitalism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 28, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/28/common-
sense-capitalism/ [https://perma.cc/7CFC-6ESJ]. 
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firm governance by developing governance policies that serve as the basis of 
their voting recommendations. The advisor voting policies are, however, 
heavily influenced by the viewpoints of the fund complexes.181 
ISS explicitly uses the viewpoints of its institutional customers to develop 
its voting guidelines.182 This allows investors to aggregate preferences and 
overcome collective action problems and to leverage their views by 
influencing smaller fund complexes with more limited governance expertise. 
Importantly and evidential of the independent and active voice of many 
mutual funds, while ISS and Glass Lewis inform mutual fund voting, they do 
not dictate it. Instead, studies have found that mutual funds increasingly 
engage in independent analysis of voting decisions.183 
Finally, even passive investors that track a popular index can affect the 
composition of the indexes themselves, thus providing a limited degree of 
control over the companies in which they must invest.184 For example, the Big 
Three were influential in persuading some index providers to exclude the 
issuers of dual class stock from their indexes.185 The literature commonly 
assumes that the composition of the major indexes is fixed and rule-based but, 
in fact, the index providers have a substantial degree of discretion over the 
criteria for inclusion.186 Investors have influenced index providers both to 
waive filters that would otherwise exclude popular or profitable firms187 and 
excluded companies that investors view as problematic.188 
 
181 See generally David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall & Brian Tayan, And Then A Miracle 
Happens!: How Do Proxy Advisory Firms Develop Their Voting Recommendations?, STAN. CLOSER 
LOOK SERIES (Stanford Univ., Stanford, Cal.), Feb. 25, 2013, 
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-31-proxy-firms-
voting-recommendations.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JCB-W6NL] (summarizing and criticizing policy 
formulation procedures of ISS and Glass Lewis). 
182 See Policy Formulation Process, ISS, https://www.issgovernance.com/policy-gateway/policy-
formulation-application/ [https://perma.cc/S3JR-BTMG] (last visited June 2, 2019). 
183 See Iliev & Lowry, supra note 157, at 466 (finding that mutual funds that stand to gain more 
from active voting frequently disagree with ISS recommendations). 
184 We are grateful to Andrew Verstein for bringing this point to our attention. 
185 See Joann S. Lublin, Big Investor Group to Push for End to Dual-Class Shares, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 
31, 2017, 11:50 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-investor-group-to-push-for-end-to-dual-class-
shares-1485817380 [https://perma.cc/9GNW-LPDY] (reporting effort by a group including BlackRock, 
State Street, and Vanguard to ban companies with dual-class shares from listing on U.S. exchanges). 
186 See Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise and Failure of 
Financial Indices, 30 YALE J. REG. 1, 18-19 (2013) (describing the broad degree of interpretive 
discretion exercised by index providers). 
187 Id. at 19 (“For example, the S&P 500 imposes profitability and domicile requirements, but 
its selection committee waives them on a case-by-case basis for popular or important firms.”). 
188 See, e.g., Emma Boyde, Index Providers Tweak Rules as Investors Raise Concerns, FIN. TIMES 
(Nov. 18, 2011), https://www.ft.com/content/b02adf58-092e-11e1-8e86-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.
cc/YH5U-W6N8] (reporting that the Russell and S&P decided to exclude Chinese reverse merger 
companies from the definition of a U.S. company, thereby excluding them from popular indexes). 
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B. Passive Investors and Activists 
As our theory predicts, passive investors play an important role in 
mediating the influence of activists. Because of their potential influence, 
activists and issuers pay increasing attention to passive investors and their 
concerns both when developing strategic interactions and when considering 
governance changes. Activists, for a variety of reasons, typically do not 
purchase more than 5-10% of a portfolio company and, in the case of large 
targets, may purchase substantially less.189 As a result, they cannot achieve 
their objective, whether that is engineering a sale of the company or achieving 
board representation, without the support of passive investors. Because of 
their substantial stakes, passive investors frequently decide the success of an 
activist campaign. For example, none of the Big Three voted in favor of Trian 
during its activist campaign at DuPont. According to media reports, if any of 
the three had supported Trian, that vote would have changed the result of the 
proxy contest and given Trian a victory.190 In post-mortems on the vote, 
DuPont’s advisors cited engagement with passive investors as a factor in 
DuPont’s win.191 
Their role as pivotal voters creates a unique opportunity for passive 
investors to engage in stewardship on an individual firm level, mediating 
the role of activists. Passive investors have a critical role in screening 
activism because their incentives may differ from those of the activists and 
some actively managed funds. Passive investors share in company-wide 
gains from valuable activism, but they lose if the activist can implement 
changes that produce short-term gains but harm the company for the long 
term because passive investors, unlike active investors, cannot exit before 
that happens.192 These incentives are likely to make passive investors take a 
more cautious approach and be less willing than actively managed funds to 
support some activists.193 
 
189 See CLAIRE A. HILL, BRIAN JM QUINN & STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON, MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS: LAW, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 767 (2d ed. 2019) (“Activists generally limit their 
stake to 10% of a target company in order to avoid application of § 16 of the ’34 Act . . . .”); see also 
Gilson & Gordon, supra note 128, at 897. 
190 See Stephen Gandel, DuPont Nearly Lost its War with Activist Nelson Peltz, FORTUNE (June 4, 
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/06/04/dupont-nelson-peltz-vote/ [https://perma.cc/46BB-PXDC]. 
191 Andrew R. Brownstein, Steven A. Rosenblum, David A. Katz & Sabastian V. Niles, 
Winning a Proxy Fight—Lessons from the DuPont-Trian Vote, HARV. LAW SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 18, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/05/18/winning-a-
proxy-fight-lessons-from-the-dupont-trian-vote/ [https://perma.cc/L2AK-CJVB]. 
192 See, e.g., In re PLX Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9880-VCL, 2018 WL 5018535, at *41 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018) (citing the concern that “particular types of investors may espouse short-
term investment strategies and structure their affairs to benefit economically from those strategies”). 
193 FactSet Sharkrepellent reports that in 2016 and 2017, activists hedge funds had a 55% and 
53% success rate, respectively, in dissident proxy contests. See generally SHARKREPELLENT, 
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Early empirical evidence supports the role of passive investors in 
intermediating hedge fund activism. A study authored by Appel, Gormley, and 
Keim found that higher passive investor ownership is associated with activists’ 
strategic choices and, in particular, an increased incidence of proxy fights.194 
This study also finds that activists are more successful in these circumstances 
and activists are more likely to obtain board representation or effect a sale of 
the company.195 These findings run contrary to other theoretical work 
suggesting that passive investors are unwilling to support activists.196 
Passive funds have also sought to police private agreements between 
managers and hedge funds. Increasingly activist proxy contests are resolved 
through settlements in which the board agrees to add one or more activist-
nominated directors.197 These settlements typically do not involve a 
shareholder vote, and there are reasons to be concerned that such settlements 
reduce management accountability.198 Some passive funds have recently 
objected to the issuer practice of settling election contests without seeking 
the input of longer-term institutional investors.199 These conclusions also 
suggest that passive investors will be able to develop reputational sanctions 
to constrain destructive hedge fund activism.200 
 
https://www.sharkrepellent.net [https://perma.cc/C3R8-QNGM] (last visited Oct. 25, 2019). For a 
recent example, in Marcato’s proxy contest with Deckers Outdoor, BlackRock and Vanguard—two 
of the five biggest shareholders in the company—voted with management. Glass Lewis sided with 
management while ISS sided with the activist. See Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Deckers Wins Proxy Contest 
Against Hedge Fund Marcato, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2017, 12:43 PM), https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-deckers-outdoor-marcato/deckers-wins-proxy-contest-against-hedge-fund-marcato-
idUSKBN1E82KR [https://perma.cc/F69S-TXDX]. While passive funds may take a more 
individualized approach to hedge fund activism, active funds may systematically avoid activism as 
inhibiting their ability to obtain alpha. 
194 See Appel et al., Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, supra note 38, at 2723. 
195 See id. at 2724. 
196 See Lund, supra note 7. 
197 See, e.g., Gail Weinstein, Warren S. de Wied & Philip Richter, Shareholder Activism: 1H 2018 
Developments and Practice Points, HARV. LAW SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 
14, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/14/shareholder-activism-1h-2018-developments-
and-practice-points/ [https://perma.cc/FJ2A-QF2G] (noting the continued prevalence of 
settlements in activist campaigns which result in the placement of a director on the targeted board). 
198 See Jill E. Fisch & Simone M. Sepe, Shareholder Collaboration, 98 TEX. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 37-39), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227113 (explaining that 
shareholder collaboration may reduce transparency and limit accountability). 
199 See Kai Haakon Liekefett & Lawrence Elbaum, Think Twice Before Settling with an Activist, 
LAW360 (Dec. 9, 2016, 12:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/869160/think-twice-before-
settlings-with-an-activist [https://perma.cc/CUW3-RUQJ]. 
200 See Kapadia, supra note 112. 
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C. The Role of Policy 
Passive investors increasingly have a role in politics and regulation.201 
They actively engage in policy discussions and generally push for greater 
voice for investors. They also engage with policymakers on a variety of issues 
beyond corporate governance. As such, they can bring their knowledge of 
policy considerations to issuers and can bring the interests of their portfolio 
companies to policymakers. At the same time, their increasing involvement 
in such matters is consistent with our theory of passive investor incentives. 
One place where passive investors have actively influenced regulatory 
policy is with their active participation in the governance of their portfolio 
companies. Passive investors regularly comment upon and call for change to 
the rules adopted by the SEC under federal securities laws. In April 1991, for 
example, Institutional Investor published a report calling for a number of proxy 
reforms to allow for increased cooperation among mutual funds.202 
Institutional investors broadly supported the reforms, which the SEC 
enacted in 1992 and which reduced the regulatory burdens for investor 
communication and collective action.203 Institutional investors have been 
active in a variety of other SEC reforms to enhance the effectiveness of 
shareholder voting rights; for example, most recently institutional investors 
have been active in shaping and attempting to forestall congressional 
proposals to regulate proxy advisory services.204 
Passive investors’ role in the formulation of public policy extends beyond 
securities regulation. As Asaf Eckstein documents, passive investors spend 
substantial sums on lobbying, provide comments on agency rulemaking, and 
participate in roundtables and other policy discussions as well as private 
meetings with lawmakers.205 Eckstein notes that executives at some passive 
investors have testified before Congress.206 Passive investors participate in 
 
201 See Asaf Eckstein, The Virtue of Common Ownership in an Era of Corporate Compliance, 105 
IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 46), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3194605 
(“Common ownership provides institutional investors with significant power, allowing them 
privileged access to lawmaking and rulemaking . . . .”). 
202 See Alicia McElhaney, Fight for Your Right to Proxy, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Nov. 10, 2017), 
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b15kfxz7qzdrpy/fight-for-your-right-to-proxy 
[https://perma.cc/C6JH-VNTR] (describing the report and its proposals). 
203 See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (Oct. 22, 1992). 
204 See Letter from the Council of Institutional Inv’rs to the U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, 
Hous., & Urban Affairs (Sept. 6, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/26/the-regulation-
of-proxy-advisory-firms/ [https://perma.cc/MSL6-8XTL] (sharing concerns about the proposed 
Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency Act). On the perils of regulating proxy advisors, 
see generally Asaf Eckstein, Great Expectations: The Peril of an Expectations Gap in Proxy Advisory 
Firm Regulation, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77 (2015). 
205 See Eckstein, supra note 201 (manuscript at 47-48). 
206 Id. at 48. 
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trade groups like the Council for Institutional Investors to develop and support 
corporate governance best practices as well as other policy positions.207 
Institutional investors now regularly take policy positions on legislation and file 
amicus briefs.208 Institutional investors were active in the negotiation and 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act and subsequent legislative efforts.209 Recently, 
institutional investors, including fund complexes with primarily passive funds, 
have been active in the fight against climate change.210 
This policy work includes both broad-based policy initiatives and firm-
specific efforts. The big mutual fund complexes regularly publish policy 
letters and missives, and several have begun using annual letters to issuers to 
highlight their policy concerns. For example, in 2019 BlackRock’s chairman 
Larry Fink issued a letter to the CEOs of all of the public companies in which 
BlackRock invests calling for more sustainable business practices.211 Similarly, 
a number of institutional investors have issued announcements calling for 
more gender diversity on corporate boards.212 In sum, existing data details 
the significant and growing involvement index fund sponsors have in 
engagement, governance, and broader policy initiatives that have market-
wide effects on their portfolio companies. 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY 
As the preceding Parts detail, we challenge the claim that passive investors 
lack incentives to be engaged and informed.213 Instead, we provide evidence 
 
207 See Associate Members, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS., https://www.cii.org/
associate_members [https://perma.cc/5NHD-NX8R] (last visited June 9, 2019) (listing BlackRock, 
Vanguard, and State Street as among the CII’s associate members). 
208 See, e.g., Zach Wener-Fligner, Every US Company Arguing for the Supreme Court to Legalize 
Same-Sex Marriage, QUARTZ (Mar. 10, 2015), https://qz.com/359424/every-us-company-arguing-for-
the-supreme-court-to-legalize-same-sex-marriage/ [https://perma.cc/WM24-SJGY] (reporting that 
BlackRock signed an amicus brief filed in the U.S. Supreme Court arguing for marriage equality for 
same-sex couples). 
209 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS., https://www.cii.org/
dodd_frank_act [https://perma.cc/M4GT-JQ36] (observing that the Council of Institutional 
Investors “advocated vigorously for many elements of the Dodd-Frank Act”). 
210 See, e.g., Ken Silverstein, More Institutional Investors Throw Weight into Fight Against Climate 
Change, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2017, 12:53 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2017/12/12/is-
the-financial-and-political-heft-behind-the-climate-fight-enough-to-make-a-difference/#41639a6
21551 [https://perma.cc/LMJ5-E49T]. 
211 Fink, supra note 35. 
212 See, e.g., Brianna Castro, Raising the Stakes on Board Gender Diversity, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 8, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/08/raising-
the-stakes-on-board-gender-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/3AMS-LKHX] (reporting announcements by 
State Street, BlackRock, and Vanguard). We do not take a stand on whether any of these initiatives is 
desirable for society at large or for the companies included in their portfolios. 
213 Cf. Lund, supra note 7, at 494-95 (arguing that active funds have incentives to monitor that 
passive funds lack). 
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of increasing passive investor engagement, a theoretical explanation for why 
passive investors have incentives to monitor their portfolio companies 
actively, and empirical evidence that this monitoring is effective.214 Our 
critiques of this literature, however, do not mean there is no reason to be 
concerned about the rise of passive investors.215 In this Part, we address 
several potential issues. Section A considers the effect of passive investing on 
market discipline. Section B explores the concern that the rise of passive 
investing will produce a harmful concentration of economic power. Section 
C identifies the distinct conflicts of interest raised by passive investors. We 
emphasize that the substantial size and engagement of passive investors is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. Accordingly, our analysis is necessarily 
preliminary. 
A. Market Discipline 
One concern raised by passive investing is its potential impact on market 
discipline. Commentators have argued that passive investing “could impair 
efficient price finding on equity markets . . . .”216 This concern arises because 
passive investors do not engage in information-based trading and have no 
discretion over buying and selling shares. 
This concern is particularly important since the premise that stock prices 
reflect firm value not only drives the market for corporate control, but also 
guides courts and independent directors.217 An important mechanism 
underlying market efficiency is trading. Informed investors sell overpriced 
stock, thereby pushing its price down to reflect its fundamental value (and 
vice versa).218 Passive investors, however, have no investment discretion: 
 
214 Our description of the channels for passive investor engagement is also inconsistent with 
academic claims that passive investor common ownership raises antitrust concerns. For an example 
of such a claim, see Posner et al., supra note 7, at 669-70. 
215 We do not make the claim that passive investors engage in socially optimal stewardship. As 
others have demonstrated, sometimes they do not. See, e.g., Brown & Davies, supra note 82, at 312 
(arguing that competition from passive funds creates a moral hazard problem and reduces the effort 
expended by active fund managers). 
216 Fichtner et al., supra note 5, at 321. 
217 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1563 (2007) (theorizing that 
independent directors look to stock prices as a signal of company value). 
218 Trading by institutional investors is associated with informational efficiency of stock prices. 
See Ekkehart Boehmer & Eric K. Kelley, Institutional Investors and the Informational Efficiency of Prices, 
22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3563, 3564 (2009) (“Based on four years of proprietary daily data on 
institutional trading, we link institutional trading to more efficient prices.”); Alex Edmans, 
Blockholders and Corporate Governance, 6 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 23, 29 (2014) (noting that 
blockholders’ informed exit can lead share price to reflect firm value); see also McCahery et al., supra 
note 168, at 2912 (reporting survey findings suggesting that selling shares because of dissatisfaction 
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even if they believe some shares in their portfolio are overpriced, passive 
investors cannot sell them. With passive investors comprising an 
increasingly large fraction of the market, the concern is that not enough 
investors will engage in information and price discovery and that market 
prices will become less efficient.219 
These concerns find some indirect support in research showing that (i) 
index inclusion can lead to stock price changes that do not necessarily reflect 
fundamentals,220 (ii) the prices of stock included in an index exhibit 
comovement, as passive funds buy and sell all the stock comprising an index 
in response to fund inflows and outflows,221 and (iii) passive investment can 
produce some temporary pricing distortions.222 There is scant evidence, 
however, on the direct effect of passive investors on the informational 
efficiency of stock prices.223 
Our theory suggests that even a sharp increase in passive investing would 
not undermine market efficiency. As a substantial percentage of the market 
becomes indexed, the gains available from having an informational advantage 
increase.224 Actively traded mutual funds and hedge funds can exploit these 
 
with performance or governance is quite prevalent; 49% of respondents sold because of the former 
and 39% because of the latter). 
219 See, e.g. STEVEN D. BLEIBERG ET AL., EPOCH INV. PARTNERS, THE IMPACT OF PASSIVE 
INVESTING ON MARKET EFFICIENCY 5-6 (2017), http://www.eipny.com/assets/pdfs/The_Impact_of_
Passive_Investing_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/PDR2-E7DV] (reporting results of three studies 
claiming that the increase in passive investing is reducing the efficiency of market prices). 
220 See, e.g., Eric Belasco, Michael Finke & David Nanigian, The Impact of Passive Investing on 
Corporate Valuations, 38 MANAGERIAL FIN. 1067, 1067-68 (2012) (noting that flows into S&P 500 
index funds affect valuations of companies within this index); Stijn Claessens & Yishay Yafeh, 
Comovement of Newly Added Stocks with National Market Indices: Evidence from Around the World, 17 
REV. FIN. 203, 205 (2012) (finding that “inclusion in a major stock market index is associated with 
increased comovement between the newly added stock and the rest of the market”). 
221 See Vladyslav Sushko & Grant Turner, The Implications of Passive Investing for Securities 
Markets, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2018, at 119. 
222 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Coles, Davidson Heath & Matthew C. Ringgenberg, On Index Investing 
(June 6, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3055324 (finding that 
index investing introduces noise into stock prices, but does not impact long-term price efficiency or 
trading by arbitrageurs). 
223 One study, for example, found that an increase in holdings by exchange traded funds is 
associated with less firm-level price efficiency. See Doron Israeli, Charles M. C. Lee & Suhas A. 
Sridharan, Is There a Dark Side to Exchange Traded Funds? An Information Perspective, 22 REV. ACCT. 
STUD. 1048, 1051 (2017) . Another study was more positive, finding that passive investors lead to 
better incorporation of systematic earning information. Lawrence R. Glosten, Suresh Nallareddy & 
Yuan Zou, ETF Activity and Informational Efficiency of Underlying Securities, MGMT. SCI. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2846157. 
224 See Jason Zweig, Are Index Funds Eating the World?, WALL ST. J.: THE INTELLIGENT 
INVESTOR (Aug. 26, 2016, 11;46 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/08/26/are-index-funds-
eating-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/PFA2-U43B] (“[I]n a market in which everyone has equal 
information, it must pay off for someone to make the extra effort to obtain superior information. So 
active management is unlikely ever to disappear.”). 
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gains225 and, as a result, increase the fees that they charge relative to the fees 
charged by passive funds.226 This will increase the incentive of active funds 
to acquire information that will give them a trading advantage over index 
funds227 and further increase the competition between active and passive 
funds.228 
Moreover, the case that passive investors undermine the informational 
efficiency of stock prices has not been made. Active investors still dominate 
the U.S. equity markets. Although estimating the precise percentage of 
equity securities that are passively invested is difficult, most commentators 
estimate that percentage as high as 50%,229 meaning that there is still a 
substantial portion of the market which is still subject to information-based 
trading strategies. Additionally, empirical and theoretical research has shown 
that price discovery and efficiency only require a small number of active 
 
225 See Sushko & Turner, supra note 221, at 120 (“[G]reater anomalies in individual security 
prices would be expected to increase the gains from informed analysis and active trading, and thus 
spur more active investment strategies.”); see also Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the 
Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 405 (1980) (describing a 
model showing that market efficiency depends on the availability of gains from acquiring 
information). 
226 Several studies document the ability of some fund managers to outperform the market 
consistently. See, e.g., Malcolm Baker, Lubomir Litov, Jessica A. Wachter & Jeffrey Wurgler, Can 
Mutual Fund Managers Pick Stocks? Evidence from Their Trades Prior to Earnings Announcements, 45 J. 
FIN & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1111, 1129-30 (2010) (finding evidence that mutual fund managers 
can trade profitably due to their ability to forecast earnings-related fundamentals); Robert Kosowski, 
Allan Timmermann, Russ Wermers & Hal White, Can Mutual Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks? New 
Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis, 61 J. FIN. 2551, 2553 (2006) (finding that a sizeable minority of 
mutual fund managers pick stocks well enough to cover their costs). 
227 We note that the emergence of such trading opportunities is unclear, in part because it is 
unlikely that the level of indexing is sufficient to generate a price effect. See, e.g., Adam Zoll, Does 
the Growth of Passive Investing Make Opportunities for Active Investors?, MORNINGSTAR (Jan. 22, 2014), 
http://www.morningstar.com/articles/631398/does-the-growth-of-passive-investing-make-
opportun.html [https://perma.cc/PWF8-A5CW] (quoting Morningstar analyst James Xiong as 
stating that “the question of whether increased indexing creates exploitable opportunities for active 
investors remains open”). 
228 As one study observes, competition among similar funds reduces the ability of mutual fund 
managers to generate consistent outperformance. See Gerard Hoberg, Nitin Kumar & 
Nagpurnanand Pabhala, Mutual Fund Competition, Managerial Skill, and Alpha Persistence, 31 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 1896, 1897 (2018). As a result, to the extent that active managers face less competition 
in a world in which a substantial percentage of assets are indexed, they should be able to outperform 
and to charge higher fees. Id. 
229 See, e.g., Alicia Adamczyk, Index Funds Are More Popular Than Ever—Here’s Why They’re a 
Amart Investment, CNBC (Sept. 19, 2019, 11:40 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/19/why-index-
funds-are-a-smart-investment.html [https://perma.cc/JH87-46Z5] (“U.S. stock index funds are 
more popular than actively managed funds for the first time ever, according to investment research 
firm Morningstar. As of August 31, these index funds held $4.27 trillion in assets, compared to $4.25 
trillion in active funds.”). 
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traders.230 Even if passive investing comprised 60% or 70% of the market, 
there would still be sufficient trading for price discovery.231 
A second concern is the impact of passive investing on governance 
decisions by IPO companies. Existing law has been deferential to firm 
governance decisions at the IPO stage, based in part on the premise that these 
decisions are subject to market discipline.232 IPO investors can, in theory, 
price an issuer’s governance structure or, in the alternative, refuse to invest in 
issuers that have bad corporate governance.233 The growth of passive 
investing, however, may reduce IPO-stage market discipline.234 
Specifically, passive investors cannot avoid purchasing the shares of an 
issuer that is to become part of their index,235 whatever the quality of its 
corporate governance.236 Passive investors, therefore, are forced buyers.237 
 
230 See Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Measuring Skill in the Mutual Fund Industry, 
118 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 18 (2015); Bradford Cornell, Passive Investing and Market Efficiency, 26 J. INV., 
Fall 2017, at 7-8. 
231 Cf. Zweig, supra note 224 (claiming that, because they trade so frequently, active funds will 
still set market prices even if the levels of passive ownership continue to rise). 
232 See Michal Barzuza, Inefficient Tailoring: The Private Ordering Paradox in Corporate Law, 8 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 131, 147 (2018) (“The IPO stage’s optimality, however, [with respect to the 
choice of governance terms] hinges on the assumption that capital markets value governance terms 
correctly.”). 
233 See, e.g., Andrew William Winden, Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment 
of Dual-Class Stock Structures, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 852, 903 (noting that “[p]roponents of 
private ordering” argue that investors are not “forced to accept the founder’s terms for investment—
investors can always choose not to invest, and the risks of agency costs created by the dual-class 
governance model are priced into the IPO share price by the market, which has the ability to assess 
and price such risks.”). 
234 Commentators have challenged this description of the IPO process as factually inaccurate 
and suggested that IPO investors may not price governance terms. See John C. Coates IV, Explaining 
Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1301, 1308 (2001); Robert Daines 
& Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 83, 85-86 (2001). 
235 The problem may be more severe in non-U.S. markets, where it may be easier for 
companies to get included in major stock indexes. In the UK, for example, listings of poorly 
governed large-cap companies from Russia and Indonesia led to their inclusion in a leading FTSE 
index. This in turn led UK institutional investors to push for new listing rules that would govern 
premium-listed companies. See Richard Wachman, FTSE Makes Room for More Russians, GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 6, 2011, 4:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/dec/06/ftse-russian-miners-
governance-concerns [https://perma.cc/F6WK-HK7X]. 
236 The Council of Institutional Investors, for example, has noted that its members follow 
passive investment strategies and therefore cannot simply decline to buy shares of such companies. 
See Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Inst. Inv’rs, to Claudia Crowley, CEO & 
Chief Regulatory Officer, NYSE (Oct. 2, 2012), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_
and_advocacy/correspondence/2012/10_2_12_cii_letter_to_nyse_dual_class_stock.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/MSL6-8XTL]. 
237 We note, however, that most indexes require that an issuer be public for a period of time 
before they are included in an index. Ari I. Weinberg, Why Index Funds Have a Limited Presence in 
the IPO Market, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2017, 10:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-index-
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Moreover, because the terms of inclusion in an index are predetermined and 
public, a company may be able to predict at the time it goes public that its 
shares will become part of a popular index. The company can then rely on 
this “fixed” demand for its shares to go public with value-reducing features.238 
Governance provisions introduced at the IPO stage may also limit 
subsequent efforts by passive investors to use their voice.239 For example, 
dual-class stock has become increasingly popular in technology companies at 
the IPO stage.240 The IPO of SNAP on March 2, 2017, is an extreme example 
in offering shares with no voting rights.241 SNAP was the first such no-vote 
IPO listed on the NYSE since 1940.242 A number of institutional investors 
had previously objected to the dual-class structure, and the SNAP IPO raised 
the intensity of these objections. As State Street explained, even passive 
investors who prefer engagement over confrontation are concerned that 
limited voting rights will lead management to give less weight to their 
concerns.243 
Following the SNAP IPO, several institutional investors responded to the 
risk of being forced to invest in companies with dual-class structures by 
asking the leading index providers to exclude dual-class companies.244 In 
response, two of the largest index providers, the S&P and the FTSE Russell, 
agreed to exclude certain multiple-class companies from their major 
 
funds-have-a-limited-presence-in-the-ipo-market-1504577040 [https://perma.cc/ZV2V-MVAK]. In 
such a case, index inclusion would not address the issuer’s ability to sell their stock at the IPO stage. 
238 See id. 
239 See e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Governance by Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 106 
CALIF. L. REV. 373, 382-399 (2018) (identifying various limitations on effective shareholder voting 
that are inconsistent with a contractual understanding of the corporation); see also Scott Hirst, Frozen 
Charters, 34 YALE J. REG. 91, 93 (2017) (explaining how voting rules adopted at the IPO stage can 
limit issuers’ ability to amend disfavored charter terms). 
240 FINRA reports that “[b]etween 2013 and late 2015, 98 companies newly listed on U.S. 
exchanges had dual class IPOs.” Supervoters, Stocks and Silicon Valley: What Investors Should Know 
About Dual Class Voting Structures, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY (Dec. 1, 2015), 
http://www.finra.org/investors/insights/supervoters-stocks-and-silicon-valley-what-investors-
should-know-about-dual-class-voting [https://perma.cc/7EDT-RP4G]. 
241 Ken Bertsch, Snap and the Rise of No-Vote Common Shares, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 26, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/26/snap-and-
the-rise-of-no-vote-common-shares/ [https://perma.cc/JGH9-LDX4]. 
242 Id. 
243 See Julie Segal, State Street Blasts Snap Over Lack of Shareholder Voting Rights, INSTITUTIONAL 
INV’R (June 23, 2017), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1505pmgs8zjg5/state-street-
blasts-snap-over-lack-of-shareholder-voting-rights [https://perma.cc/5Q3S-DVSB]. 
244 See Letter from Kenneth A. Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of Inst. Inv’rs, to MSCI Equity 
Index Comm. 6 (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/8-3-
17%20CII%20response%20to%%20MSCI%20Consutation.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G25-JZMM] 
(“CII’s membership includes strong supporters of passive index strategies, and we believe that major 
index providers have a critical role to play in preventing non-voting and multi-class equity structures 
from gaining unstoppable momentum.”). 
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indexes.245 The third major index provider, the MSCI, decided after an 
eighteen-month consultation period to retain dual-class issuers in its major 
indexes but to create a series of new benchmarks that contain voting rights in 
their eligibility criteria.246 Notably, however, not all passive investors 
supported the approach of excluding dual-class stock from the major indexes. 
BlackRock expressed the concern that its passive funds would be deprived of 
investments in high growth technology stocks which active funds could still 
purchase. 247 
At present, a number of institutions are seeking an alternative approach 
in which the stock exchanges, rather than index providers, would impose 
limits on issuer use of dual-class structures. This would free passive funds 
from the obligation to invest in issuers with problematic dual-class structures, 
essentially imposing the market discipline available to active funds through 
listing requirements rather than individual stock selection and showing the 
ability of passive investors to affect governance practices.248 
B. Concentration of Ownership 
A second concern raised by the growth of passive investors is concentration 
of ownership. As John Coates explains, indexation has created organizations—
large mutual fund sponsors—“controlled by a small number of individuals with 
unsurpassed power.”249 The Big Three are the largest shareholders in 40% of 
U.S. listed corporations and 88% of the largest companies.250 Coates warns that 
 
245 See Abe M. Friedman, Bob McCormick, Allie M. Rutherford & Rob Zivnuska, S&P and FTSE 
Russell on Exclusion of Companies with Multi-Class Shares, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REG. (Aug. 5, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/08/05/sp-and-ftse-russell-on-exclusion-
of-companies-with-multi-class-shares/ [https://perma.cc/LX8J-APEU] (describing the index providers’ 
new policies, which included “partially or fully exclud[ing] companies with multiple-class share 
structures”); see also Chris Dieterich, Maureen Farrell & Sarah Krouse Stock Indexes Push Back Against 
Dual-Class Listings, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stock-indexes-push-back-
against-dual-class-listings-1501612170 [https://perma.cc/79LQ-SS2R] (reporting S&P’s decision that 
Snap and other dual class companies would not be eligible for inclusion in the S&P 500 index). 
246 Rachel Evans, MSCI Rejects Calls to Ban Dual-Class Stocks From its Indexes, BLOOMBERG 
(Oct. 30, 2018, 5:05 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-30/msci-rejects-calls-
to-ban-dual-class-stocks-from-its-indexes [https://perma.cc/294C-QFG5]. 
247 Ning Chiu, BlackRock Wants Equal Voting Rights but Opposes Exclusion from Indexes, DAVIS 
POLK BRIEFING: GOVERNANCE (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.briefinggovernance.com/2017/10/
blackrock-wants-equal-voting-rights-but-opposes-exclusion-from-indexes/ [https://perma.cc/EV2F
-ETKY] (citing BlackRock’s concern that excluding dual-class companies from the index would 
deprive their index-based clients of “opportunities for returns”). 
248 See, e.g., Dual-Class Stock, COUNCIL OF INST. INV’RS (2019), https://www.cii.
org/dualclass_stock [https://perma.cc/6YBC-NSWN] (explaining that “[s]tock exchanges could 
voluntarily address the matter by ensuring their listing standards bar companies with dual-class 
structures”). 
249 Coates, supra note 8, at 3. 
250 Griffith & Lund, supra note 123, at 1156. 
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this concentration has resulted in the ownership rights for most portfolio 
companies being concentrated in the hands of a small number of individuals 
who work for the major fund sponsors,251 thereby raising legitimacy, 
accountability, and other concerns associated with the concentration of 
economic power in a small group of individuals. 
Coates’ observation is correct in that the increased ownership concentration 
resulting from the growth of passive investing will change the nature of 
corporate governance, but is this a cause for concern? We suggest that, although 
this concentration may present challenges, it may also provide benefits. 
The rise of sponsors with significant ownership stakes has the potential 
to reduce the collective action problems that modern corporations have faced 
since the 1930s.252 Berle and Means identified the managerial agency costs 
that arise when professional managers control corporations with dispersed 
public ownership.253 These managerial agency costs have been the central 
focus of corporate law for almost a century.254 The reconcentration of 
ownership in the hands of the major mutual fund families offers the potential 
to reduce these agency costs.255 The engagement that we document and the 
empirical studies finding passive investor ownership increases hedge fund 
activism and monitoring support this conclusion.256 
Moreover, the investment horizon of passive investors is likely to be 
longer than those of active funds and activists.257 Thus, for those concerned 
with the possibility that short-termism may accompany greater monitoring 
by active mutual funds and hedge funds, passive investors with a significant 
ownership stake serve as a valuable antidote. Ironically, this reconcentration 
and empowerment of mutual funds may partially overcome some of the 
management entrenchment motivation that led to the regulation of the 
 
251 See Coates, supra note 8, at 14 (“It is not an exaggeration to say that even if this mega-trend 
begins to taper off, the majority of the 1,000 largest U.S. companies will be controlled by a dozen or 
fewer people over the next ten to twenty years.”). 
252 Berle and Means most notably identified the problem of dispersed small ownership and the 
resulting empowerment of management. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. 
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
253 Id. 
254 See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 
1554, 1624 (2015) (“[S]hareholders’ ability to minimize managerial agency costs is one of the most 
important challenges in the corporate governance of widely held firms.”). 
255 See, e.g., Edmans, supra note 218, at 25-33 (reviewing the literature on the various ways in 
which large shareholders engage in corporate governance and reduce agency costs). 
256 See supra notes 194-196 and accompanying text. 
257 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Busse, Lin Tong, Qing Tong & Zhe Zhang, Trading Regularity and Fund 
Performance, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 374, 388-90 (2019) (explaining that active funds trade more 
frequently in response to information and finding that such trading correlates with performance); 
Bidisha Chakrabarty, Pamela C. Moulton & Charles Trzcinka, The Performance of Short-term 
Institutional Trades, 52 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1403, 1406 (2017) (identifying the concern 
that mutual fund managers engage in short-term trading to “look active”). 
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mutual fund industry and the variety of requirements that have the effect of 
fragmenting mutual fund ownership of portfolio companies.258 
In addition, our analysis of the institutional context suggests that the 
major sponsors are unlikely to act as a monolithic single owner; their interests 
vary substantially depending on the composition of the fund, and the business 
model and other business activities of the fund’s sponsor.259 As a result, while 
the major fund sponsors will play a greater role in the oversight of large 
portfolio companies, there is little reason to believe that fund sponsors will 
vote or otherwise act as a block.260 
Moreover, the increased influence of passive investors does not operate in 
a vacuum. As noted above, actively managed funds continue to dominate the 
mutual fund market, and they have the ability to use the information obtained 
through their firm-specific analysis to influence by means of both their voting 
power and their trading decisions. In the same way that passive investors are 
a check on hedge fund activism, hedge funds are a powerful check on the 
influence of passive investors. Hedge funds continue to make concentrated 
investments in a limited number of portfolio companies and to engage in 
highly substantive analysis, often bringing value-enhancing operational 
insights to those companies.261 Indeed, activist activity continues to rise. As 
of early 2019, there were more than 100 activist hedge funds, and they engaged 
in a record level of activity in 2018.262 
Finally, the most important counterbalance to passive investor influence 
is the continued role of corporate management. In the previous Part, we 
explained that, as pivotal shareholders, passive investors need not resort to 
aggressive tactics to influence management. This analysis, however, does not 
mean that passive investors can control specific business or operational 
decisions. Corporate law vests ultimate control of corporate decision making 
in the hands of the board of directors, and shareholders lack both the legal 
 
258 For development of the argument that regulation of the mutual fund industry was a result 
of political pressure designed to prevent institutions that potentially could influence industry from 
becoming too big and powerful, see Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund 
Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1469, 1470-71 (1991). 
259 See, e.g., Fichtner et al., supra note 5, at 307 (“These portfolios may have different interests 
when it comes to shareholder vote.”). 
260 Indeed, even those who criticize passive owners observe that they do not all vote their 
shares the same way. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 8 (manuscript at 41-42); Griffith & Lund, 
supra note 123, at 1179-80. 
261 See Fisch & Sepe, supra note 198 (manuscript at 14). 
262 Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds and Other Activist Investors, HARV. LAW 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2019/01/25/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-and-other-activist-investors-2/ 
[https://perma.cc/9F9Q-47KQ]. 
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authority and the ability to make operational decisions.263 The corporate 
board is both the first mover and holds veto power with respect to shareholder 
initiatives, and courts have defended the board’s veto power in a variety of 
contexts.264 Both in Delaware and elsewhere, statutory and decisional law 
gives corporate boards foundational control over corporate decisions, and 
shareholder power is limited to voting on a small number of issues designated 
by the statute and exercising influence through engagement.265 Even hedge 
fund activists typically seek board representation because of their inability to 
effect changes in their capacity as shareholders.266 Other regulatory 
restrictions also limit the ability of funds to exercise control, such as section 
13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act.267 
The analysis above assumes that fund sponsors—and the individuals that 
make decisions on their behalf—use their power for the benefit of their 
beneficiaries. However, sponsors may also face conflicts of interest.268 We 
address this concern next.   
C. Conflicts of Interest 
A third concern is the potential for conflicts of interest. Like other 
institutional investors, passive funds are managed by entities and individuals 
that have their own incentives and interests. The mutual fund sponsors and 
investment advisors, who make decisions on behalf of passive investors, do not 
own the assets that they manage, and instead “invest other people’s money.”269 
 
263 See, e.g., James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 257, 291 (2015) (explaining that board of directors has broad statutory authority and that 
shareholders’ powers are limited). 
264 See, e.g., Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 55 (Del. Ch. 2011) (upholding 
board’s authority to reject a tender offer despite widespread shareholder support). 
265 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 557-59 (2003) (describing exclusive board authority as essential 
to overcome shareholder collective action problems). 
266 See Fisch & Sepe, supra note 198 (manuscript at 16-18) (describing increasing number of 
hedge fund-nominated directors and defending board representation as a mechanism by which 
issuers and hedge funds can aggregate information). 
267 See, e.g., Morley, supra note 46, at 1423-30 (observing that section 13(d) is one of several 
reasons why mutual funds cannot engage effectively in activism). 
268 As Coates suggests, the few individuals who control the sponsors of the largest passive 
funds might use their power to advance their own private benefits (pecuniary or nonpecuniary). The 
potential for self-dealing by mutual fund managers is a standard agency problem which, although 
legitimate, does not differ conceptually from the potential for self-dealing by corporate managers, 
and the standard legal tools for minimizing such self-dealing such as independent boards and 
fiduciary duties apply. But cf. Eric D. Roiter, Disentangling Mutual Fund Governance from Corporate 
Governance, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2016) (identifying distinctions between mutual fund 
governance and standard corporate governance). 
269 Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 7, at 93. 
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Although scholars have analyzed the agency costs and moral hazard 
problems associated with institutional investors generally, passive investors 
are distinctive. On the one hand, agency costs are less likely to influence 
investment decisions because the fund’s portfolio composition is constrained 
by the applicable index.270 On the other hand, the size and voting power of 
passive funds gives their sponsors substantial power to influence their 
portfolio companies. The concern then is that fund sponsors will leverage this 
power in ways that benefit the sponsors’ other funds or business activities. 
The motivation for doing so is that these other activities are more lucrative 
for the sponsor than the fees generated by passive funds. We identify three 
concerns: first, conflicts of interest arising from business ties between 
sponsors and portfolio companies; second, the incentive to favor active over 
passive funds; third, the effect of cross ownership on voting. 
One concern is that potential business ties between sponsors and 
companies’ management may affect passive funds’ voting behavior. 
Commentators have identified some of the potential conflicts arising from 
business ties between public companies and fund sponsors.271 For example, as 
discussed previously, Vanguard and Fidelity provide extensive services to 
employer-sponsored 401(k) plans.272 These services create the risk that 
Vanguard and Fidelity will vote the shares of their funds in favor of 
management rather than in the best interests of the fund shareholders, in 
order to curry favor from management and win or retain 401(k) plan business. 
The literature explores the potential impact of a fund sponsor’s relationships 
with its portfolio companies on fund voting decisions, and there is at least 
some evidence that these relationships increase the frequency with which the 
sponsor’s funds will support management.273 
A second concern is that sponsors will use the power provided by the large 
holdings of passive investors for the benefit of the more lucrative active funds 
 
270 Fund sponsors and advisors face the potential of conflicts whenever they allocate 
investment opportunities because of their ability to favor one client or fund over another. See, e.g., 
McLaughlin, supra note 49 (describing as a conflict Fidelity’s decision to invest in a variety of pre-
IPO companies through its private venture funds, which are owned by the Johnson family, rather 
than through its mutual funds). 
271 See, e.g., Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds, 85 
J. FIN. ECON. 552, 553 (2007) (studying voting patterns of mutual funds whose sponsors manage 
employee benefit plans for public companies). 
272 See, e.g., Greg Iacurci, Fidelity Pushes Vanguard to Compete on Brand in 401(k) Plans, INV. NEWS 
(Jan. 24, 2018, 2:48 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20180124/FREE/180129959/fidelity-
pushes-vanguard-to-compete-on-brand-in-401-k-plans [https://perma.cc/RLH5-ZVUS] (describing 
competition between Fidelity and Vanguard both for revenue from administering 401(k) plans and for 
investment funds in such plans). 
273 See, e.g., Rasha Ashraf, Narayanan Jayaraman & Harley E. Ryan, Jr., Do Pension-Related 
Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive 
Compensation, 47 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 567, 587 (2012). 
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within the same family. Because its actively managed funds generate higher 
fees, a sponsor’s management of multiple funds creates the risk that active 
managers will cause passive funds to act in ways that favor the interests of the 
active funds. The literature has noted the possibility that mutual fund 
sponsors will favor the interests of some funds over others, but it has not fully 
explored the issue.274 
There are a variety of situations in which the interests of individual 
mutual funds offered by a fund sponsor may differ.275 Two funds offered by a 
single sponsor may own different proportions of competing firms such that 
improving governance at one firm reduces the advantage of its competitor. A 
passive fund might be long in a portfolio company in which its sponsor’s 
hedge fund has a short position. In either case, the passive fund might vote 
against value-enhancing measures at the firm.276 
Sponsors might also use the access provided by their holdings to obtain 
information about their portfolio companies and then use that information to 
inform trading decisions for the benefit of investors in their other products, 
such as actively managed funds or hedge funds. For example, sponsors could 
use negative information to short or underweight their holdings in particular 
companies, enabling their active funds to outperform the benchmark.277 
Similarly, passive fund sponsors may value the access to management 
afforded by the substantial stakes held by their passive funds, access that 
provides value to their actively managed funds. To the extent that sponsors 
can leverage this access into better-informed stock-picking by active 
managers, it will enable them to charge higher fees for their actively managed 
funds. There is some evidence that fund sponsors tend to favor funds that 
 
274 See, e.g., José-Miguel Gaspar, Massimo Massa & Pedro Matos, Favoritism in Mutual Fund 
Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross-Fund Subsidization, 61 J. FIN. 73, 74 (2006). 
275 See, e.g., John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund 
Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1261 (2014) (terming such conflicts “pervasive” and 
observing that “[f]inancial economists and legal scholars have thus found the conflicts that arise 
from the simultaneous management of multiple funds in investment management companies 
extremely alarming”). 
276 Fidelity’s unique policy of delegating the voting of its index funds to a third-party advisor 
is one way to address this concern. See supra note 150. 
277 The extent to which this occurs is unclear. We note, however, that BlackRock received 
attention in connection with the January 2018 collapse of Carillion in the U.K. See Emma Rumney, 
Ben Martin & Alasdair Pal, Carillion Collapse Hits Banks and Investors, Boosts Short Sellers, REUTERS 
(Jan. 15, 2018, 11:31 AM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-carillion-restructuring-funds/carillion-
collapse-hits-banks-and-investors-boosts-short-sellers-idUKKBN1F424D [https://perma.cc/NCF3-
VU7L]. Moreover, to the extent this latter scenario is based on a fund sponsor’s ability to access 
material nonpublic information, both the issuer and the sponsor have strong incentives to avoid 
conduct that would amount to illegal insider trading. 
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charge higher fees and are therefore more profitable for them.278 This 
favoritism could, in theory, lead a mutual fund sponsor to refrain voting its 
substantial passive fund holdings against or criticizing management if the 
vote would harm the active fund, even when such opposition would be 
warranted. Similarly, contrary to the interests of its beneficiaries, a passive 
fund might support an activist campaign that is likely to produce only short-
term value if the actively managed funds in its fund sponsor hold substantial 
positions in shares of the target company. 
We do not believe that these possibilities lead to the conclusion that fund 
sponsors must segregate the engagement and voting decisions of their passive 
and active funds. Under our framework, fund sponsors’ operation of their 
funds in a way that maximizes their common interests is generally an 
advantage of the fund family structure rather than a bug. The ability of fund 
managers to pool the informational advantages of their multiple funds and 
fund managers generates economies of scale. The ability to leverage passive 
fund voting power and active fund expertise creates valuable synergies. 
Indeed, it is misleading to portray managers’ ability to manage their fund 
families collectively as a conflict of interest. Because, as noted above, the 
investment fund industry is highly competitive, sponsors are limited in their 
ability to retain rents from this behavior; rather it is the fund customers who 
reap the benefits from the implicit cross-subsidization among funds. An 
example is Fidelity’s recent adoption of zero-fee mutual funds, funds that can 
only exist by virtue of the cross-subsidies that the assets in those funds 
provide to Fidelity’s other business operations. 
In addition, analyzing interests and incentives from the perspective of an 
individual fund mistakenly conflates the interest of the fund and its 
customers. As noted above, customers often invest in multiple funds offered 
by a single fund family. To the extent that Fidelity customers own shares in 
its zero-fee Large Cap fund, they benefit if the operations of that fund are 
subsidized by the higher-fee Magellan fund. But those same customers may 
also own shares in the Magellan fund and benefit from the increased leverage 
that fund enjoys because its portfolio company holdings are aggregated with 
those in other Fidelity funds.279 Likewise, many Fidelity customers invest in 
Fidelity mutual funds because Fidelity is the administrator of their 
employer’s 401(k) plan, thereby benefiting from the coordinated business 
operations of the retirement services and the mutual funds. 
 
278 See Gaspar et al., supra note 274, at 74; see also Diane Del Guercio, Egemen Genç, Hai Tran, 
Playing Favorites: Conflicts of Interest in Mutual Fund Management, 128 J. FIN. ECON. 535 (2018) 
(finding that funds whose managers also manage hedge funds underperform peer mutual funds). 
279 In fact, given the potential for cross-subsidization, if the Magellan fund can charge higher 
fees as a result of this leverage, that benefit inures even to the benefit of Fidelity customers who 
only invest in the zero-fee funds. 
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A third issue that has received recent attention is the potential conflict 
created by cross-ownership.280 Each mutual fund is likely to own positions in 
a large number of portfolio companies, and the business interests of those 
companies may conflict. There are a variety of issues on which a fund’s vote 
at one portfolio company can potentially benefit or harm the interests of 
another portfolio company. How, then, should the fund take those interests 
into account when making its voting decisions? 
The effect of cross-ownership is particularly apparent in the context of 
merger voting, in which an individual mutual fund may own stock in both 
the acquirer and the target company. When both bidder and target are 
public companies that belong to an index, it is common for passive funds to 
hold shares of both.281 A merger may present a direct conflict between the 
interests of the merging companies, as the terms of the merger may be 
beneficial for the target but not for the acquirer, or vice versa. Alternatively, 
the merger may decrease value overall but serve the interests of one of the 
merger companies.282 
Shareholder voting is becoming increasingly important in the merger 
context due to developments in Delaware case law that reduce the level of 
judicial scrutiny when a transaction has been approved by an informed vote 
of the independent shareholders.283 In the recent litigation challenging Tesla’s 
merger with SolarCity, plaintiffs made the novel argument that the largest 
shareholders in both Tesla and SolarCity (i.e., the Big Three and other mutual 
 
280 See, e.g., Griffith & Lund, supra note 123, at 1157 (describing the fact that an institution has 
“interests on both sides of a transaction” as a “conflict of interest”). 
281 Notably, however, this is an issue that is common to all mutual funds, not simply passive 
funds, although the rise of passive investing increases the frequency of cross-ownership. See Chris 
Brooks, Zhong Chen & Yeqin Zeng, Institutional Cross-Ownership and Corporate Strategy: The Case of 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 48 J. CORP. FIN. 187, 189 (2018) (finding that, in a sample of 2604 mergers 
between U.S. public firms from 1984 to 2014, on average, 18% of acquirer stocks are held by target 
institutional owners and 21% of target stocks are held by acquirer institutional owners). 
282 Some commentators have argued that the Tesla SolarCity merger, for example, was a value-
decreasing merger. See Griffith & Lund, supra note 123, at 1153. Similar concerns were raised about 
the HP-Compaq merger and, indeed, Walter Hewitt, a substantial HP shareholder, successfully 
filed litigation challenging the merger. Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 19513-NC, 2002 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 35 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2002). In retrospect, the HP-Compaq merger appeared to be 
value-enhancing for both companies. See, e.g., Alice LaPlante, Compaq and HP: Ultimately, the Urge 
to Merge Was Right, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. BUS.: INSIGHTS (June 1, 2007), 
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/compaq-hp-ultimately-urge-merge-was-right 
[https://perma.cc/CJ5J-SEWT] (reporting “the consensus is that the merger was indeed a good 
idea”). 
283 See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings, LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312-13 (Del. 2015). For a further 
discussion of Delaware’s redefinition of these standards to an arguably lower level, see generally 
Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Delaware’s Takeover Standards, 
in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? (Steven 
Davidoff Solomon & Randall Stuart Thomas eds., 2019); Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The 
Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 263 (2019). 
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fund sponsors) were not disinterested for purposes of the Tesla vote to 
approve the merger due to this cross-ownership.284 Plaintiffs argued that 
these investors—“unlike other Tesla stockholders who did not own SolarCity 
stock–had a powerful economic incentive to use Tesla’s capital to bail out 
SolarCity . . . .”285 They argued that this conflict of interest “distort[ed] an 
effective exercise of the franchise” and that, accordingly, their votes to 
approve the merger should be excluded as not independent.286 
We do not address the plaintiffs’ argument that the mutual fund votes in 
Tesla should not qualify as disinterested under the Corwin standard except to 
note that Delaware law does not generally inquire into the motivations of 
non-controlling shareholders when they are exercising their voting rights.287 
We are unpersuaded, however, that from the perspective of the mutual funds’ 
customers, the voting reflected a conflict of interest. Mutual funds’ fiduciary 
duties require them to vote in a manner that benefits their investors, not each 
company that they hold in their portfolio.288 For a mutual fund, as with an 
ordinary investor, cross-ownership complicates voting decisions. There is no 
single right answer, but a mutual fund, like any investor, is entitled to vote in 
whatever way maximizes the interests of its investors without regard to 
whether that vote is calculated to maximize the value of the portfolio 
company.289 Thus, in voting on a merger, a rational investor might vote to 
support a merger that is welfare-increasing overall, an investor might vote in 
 
284 Plaintiffs’ Answering Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second 
Amended Complaint at 23-24, In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 
1560293 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018) (No. 12711-VCS), 2017 WL 3316057 [hereinafter Tesla Motors 
Plaintiffs’ Answer]. Tesla’s top 25 institutional shareholders, which collectively held 45.7% of Tesla’s 
stock, also owned shares in Solar City. See In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12711-
VCS, 2018 WL 1560293, at *10 n.183 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018). 
285 Tesla Motors Plaintiffs’ Answer, supra note 284, at 34. 
286 Id. at 35 (quotation omitted). 
287 See, e.g., Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions, supra note 117, at 47-48 (observing that Delaware 
courts have “recognized a shareholder’s right to act selfishly in exercising its voting power [and that 
shareholders] are under no obligation to vote their shares in the best interests of the corporation”). 
288 See, e.g., Tanzer v. Int’l Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Del. 1977) (quoting WILLIAM 
MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
§ 2031 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1976)) (“At a stockholders’ meeting, each stockholder represents himself 
and his own interests solely and in no sense acts as a trustee or representative of others . . . .”), 
overruled by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
289 The fact that cross-ownership does not imply a clear voting strategy may explain why the 
existing evidence on the effect of cross-ownership on mergers is mixed. At least one study found 
that institutional investors’ ownership of both bidders and targets affects their voting on 
acquisitions. See Gregor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Cross-ownership, Returns, and Voting in 
Mergers, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 391, 400 (2008); see also Brooks et. al., supra note 281, at 197-202 (finding 
that acquirers with higher institutional cross-ownership pay lower premiums for targets and tend to 
use stock as the method of payment). In contrast, a study focusing on the years 1984-2006 found no 
effect on vote outcomes or deal characteristics. See Jarrad Harford, Dirk Jenter & Kai Li, Institutional 
Cross-holdings and Their Effect on Acquisition Decisions, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 27, 27 (2011). 
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accordance with the relative size of its holdings in the target and acquiring 
company, or an investor might vote the stock of each portfolio company in 
accordance with its view of the best interest of that company, considered on 
a stand-alone basis. 
Cross-ownership can occur at the sponsor level as well as the individual 
fund level, and different issues arguably arise when different funds within the 
same sponsor own different stock.290 One might argue that cross-ownership 
among funds is particularly problematic for sponsors that centralize their 
voting decisions because, in making a voting decision for a specific fund, a 
fund sponsor might not consider only the interests of that fund’s beneficiaries, 
but instead might consider the interests of other funds within the fund family, 
the overall value or surplus created by the merger, or the interests of the 
funds’ shareholders across the entire portfolio.291 
Our preceding analysis concerning sponsors that manage multiple funds 
addresses this issue as well. Outside the merger context, votes that raise 
conflicts between funds are rare, and fund sponsors have the flexibility to 
leverage the advantages of running multiple funds while limiting potential 
conflicts. The more complex analysis applicable in the merger context likely 
explains why even sponsors that generally centralize their voting decisions 
make exceptions for merger votes.292 
Moreover, our analysis suggests that, particularly in the merger context, 
an analysis of the duties owed by fund sponsors in connection with their 
voting decisions is more nuanced. Because individual mutual fund customers 
may own different funds within the family, it is impossible to adopt a voting 
rule that would maximize value for all the funds’ customers.293 A sponsor that 
managed funds owning shares in both Tesla and SolarCity, for example, might 
determine that the merger would be good for SolarCity and bad for Tesla.294 
That determination, we argue, should neither prevent the sponsor from 
 
290 See generally Ann M. Lipton, Family Loyalty: Mutual Fund Voting and Fiduciary Obligation, 19 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 175 (2017). 
291 See Lipton, supra note 175, at 309 (observing that institutional investors increasingly face 
“conflicts between investor preferences in their shareholder and non-shareholder capacities”). 
292 See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
293 As with other shareholders, a mutual fund’s customers may also have interests in the merger 
that are unrelated to their ownership of that fund, including other securities positions, hedging, 
status as an employee in one of the companies in the merger, and so forth. 
294 A fund sponsor could also rationally determine that the merger was in the interests of both 
Tesla and SolarCity. We note that ISS endorsed the merger, concluding that Tesla was paying a low 
premium and finding it to be a “necessary step” for Tesla to become an integrated sustainable-energy 
company. Claudia Assis, SolarCity Jumps After Tesla Merger Receives ISS Endorsement, MARKETWATCH 
(Nov. 4, 2016, 3:04 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/solarcity-jumps-after-tesla-merger-
receives-iss-endorsement-2016-11-04 [https://perma.cc/T48A-7YGW]. Alternatively, a sponsor may 
have concluded that voting in favor of a merger supported by Tesla’s innovative and powerful CEO 
Elon Musk was appropriate. 
 
2019] The New Titans of Wall Street 71 
voting the shares of all the funds in favor of the merger nor compel the 
sponsor to vote against the merger.295 To the extent that a sponsor votes in a 
way that maximizes value across the sum of the sponsors’ holdings, that 
approach is both predictable and desirable. We note that evaluating a merger 
at the level of the fund sponsor is consistent with centralization of all voting 
decisions at the sponsor level, and we argue that although such centralization 
should not be required, it is permissible. 
CONCLUSION 
Passive investors are the new kings of our capital markets, at least for the 
time being. The recent and continued growth of passive investing will no 
doubt change our capital markets, and commentators are already responding 
to these changes with alarm. In this Article, we provide the first theoretical 
framework for passive investment as a basis for further study of this new 
phenomenon. 
The core of our analysis is a theoretical understanding of the institutional 
context in which passive investors operate. In particular, we explain three 
critical features of this institutional context. First, although index funds are 
locked into their investments, the shareholders who invest in these funds are 
not. Second, the existing literature analyzes the behavior and incentives of 
passive investors at the level of the individual mutual fund but fails to 
recognize that fund sponsors are the drivers of fund behavior and that they 
have incentives to maximize revenue across their entire menu of funds. 
Finally, individual investors are often customers of a fund sponsor, and their 
interests cannot be analyzed only by reference to their holdings in a single 
fund. For all these reasons, recent criticism of passive investors and their 
incentives is incomplete and, we argue, deficient. 
Our fundamental insight is that because of the competition faced by 
mutual fund sponsors, the sponsors that offer passive funds need to exercise 
their governance rights in an informed manner to promote firm value. Passive 
investors must do this by relying on voice, rather than exit. We highlight the 
structural advantages of passive investors with respect to certain types of 
engagement, particularly market-wide initiatives such as improving corporate 
governance. We also explain the role that passive investors can play in 
mediating shareholder activism. We document the growing evidence that 
passive investors are behaving in ways that are consistent with this theory. 
We further analyze the implications of our theory for several potential 
concerns raised by the increase in passive investing, including its effect on 
 
295 Voting the shares of each fund in a way that is rational on a stand-alone basis or using “mirror” 
voting to vote proportionately to the votes cast by other shareholders would also be rational approaches. 
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market discipline, its role in market concentration, and the potential it creates 
for conflicts of interest. A more nuanced understanding of the institutional 
context suggests that a number of these concerns are, at present, overstated. 
We caution the need for regulators to incorporate our analysis and to resist 
calls for a regulatory response before the role and ownership scope of passive 
investors are more fully understood. While it is too early to resolve the net 
effect of passive investors on economic outcomes, this Article provides a 
theoretical framework for analyzing future passive investor conduct and any 
proposed policies to address their extraordinary rise. 
 
